

Lewis quite obviously never has known the rapture of a west Texas dawn where the sun flames crimson on the rugged canyon walls and the day opens big as all outdoors.

Someday when Mr. Lewis' lungs are choked with smog and his nostrils offended by the exhaust fumes of the eastern metropolis, his nerves a jangle from the raucous bleatings of the auto horn, he should seek a week of serene repose in the lush, semitropical beauty of the Rio Grande Valley where the fragrance of some budding plant forever scents the atmosphere, multicolored foliage salves the eyes, and where the nerves are balmed at siesta time by the gentle stroking of guitars.

Or perhaps he should take a leisurely canter on horseback through the Texas hill country in springtime when blue-bonnets cover the meadows with an azure blanket, or relax by gondola through the picturesque downtown meanderings of the San Antonio River beneath the storied Alamo, or drive the freeway between Fort Worth and Dallas where the skylines of the twin cities loom breath-takingly out of the plain.

I wish he could visit Six Flags over Texas, or the Chondor Gardens in Weatherford, or Houston's Astrodome, or the Sunken Gardens of Brackenridge Park, or the Botanic Gardens of Fort Worth.

No scenic beauties? Texas has so many we cannot even name them all.

ASSATEAGUE ISLAND

(Mr. TODD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TODD. Mr. Speaker, I have become concerned by the shortage of adequate public beach facilities in the middle Atlantic coastal region. Cape Cod has relieved the pressure for swimming areas in New England, and the Fire Island National Seashore seems adequate for New York City, but there is a long gap between Fire Island and the next national seashore south, Cape Hatteras, N.C.

Assateague Island, it seems to me, is the logical solution to this problem, and I urge that we take immediate action to make the island a national seashore.

Assateague is ideally located to serve the large portion of our eastern populace which now has little or no access to good beaches. Within a 250-mile radius of the island live over 34 million people, one-fifth of our entire population, most in the large metropolitan areas of Washington, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Wilmington, and Richmond. And there seems little doubt that Assateague could accommodate this terrific demand. The Department of the Interior recently estimated that a national seashore at Assateague could probably serve 3 million each year.

This spring I spent two weekends on Assateague, and I am convinced that it would be perfect as a national seashore. The southern tip of the island is quite wooded and marshy, an ideal refuge for

thousands of ducks, geese, and swans, as well as the famous wild ponies. The northern end, on the other hand, is a long, wide beach. The water temperature there is moderate, and the dropoff gradual. Even on rough days, I am told, there is virtually no undertow. In short, it is an ideal swimming area.

At the same time, because of its topography, Assateague is not at all suited for private cottages or summer residences. In the first place, if many homes were built there, before long, there would be a terrific sewage disposal problem. In an effort to prevent sewage contamination on the island, the Maryland State Health Department has banned all septic tanks. It feels that the only solution to the problem is a fairly complicated sewage system—a system much too costly to be financed by any private land developer.

But the main reason that Assateague is not suitable for private housing development is that it often floods. In the hurricane of March 1962, for example, the island was almost completely submerged. The Washington Post's account of the storm read:

In . . . the great storm, the ocean rolled right across Assateague into Chincoteague Bay at perhaps five points. Dunes were washed away and the sand deposited in what had been swamps. The shoreline was moved, leaving former beaches deep under water. One summer house, built foresightedly on deep pilings in the dunes, was left with its doorstep out of reach above the new ground level.

In short, I feel that the arguments in favor of a national seashore at Assateague are indisputable: There is a terrific need for swimming facilities in this area; Assateague has an ideal beach; and it is completely unsuitable for private ownership and development. It is my hope, therefore, that in the near future the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs will hold hearings on the Assateague National Seashore bills, and that it will see fit to act favorably on them. A Senate committee has already done so, and it is of the utmost urgency and importance that we follow suit.

NEW YORK STATE MOVING TOWARD ADOPTION OF LOTTERY AS A SOUND SOCIAL AND REVENUE DEVICE

(Mr. FINO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINO. Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday, I spoke before this House to announce that the New York State Senate had voted in favor of a State lottery by a 2-to-1 majority. Today, it is my pleasure to announce that the State assembly followed suit and also voted in favor of a resolution for a constitutional amendment to establish a State lottery. I am happy to say that the assembly did so by a majority of 8 to 1.

This, Mr. Speaker, means that a State lottery is about to become a reality in New York. After next year's legislative action on this proposal, the people will

have an opportunity to vote on it in 1966.

I am confident that this lottery proposal, which I have supported for a long time, will win an overwhelming victory because the people want a lottery to help ease their tax burdens.


There is no doubt that New York has immense illegal gambling activity which should be tapped for the public good. I am confident that a lottery in New York will cut heavily into the multibillion-dollar gambling activity which has been for too long a monopoly of the underworld crime syndicates.

New York proposes to use lottery revenues for education—this will certainly be a great boom to education in New York.

The legalization of a State lottery in New York will prove to our neighboring States that hypocrisy costs money. I say this because people from all over the United States will look forward to the opportunity to buy a New York State lottery ticket.

Let me say, Mr. Speaker, that the New York State Legislature's vote on the lottery proposal is further evidence of a growing trend toward the lottery idea as a sound social and revenue device—a trend which will be more and more felt even in the Congress as the years go by.

FE



Callaway

(Mr. CALLAWAY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Speaker, I feel certain that of all the various phases of this Nation's foreign policy, the one in which this Congress is most interested is the war in Vietnam.

I have this week returned from a brief tour of that country, the purpose of which was to better my understanding of the situation through firsthand experience. During the week I was briefed by Ambassador Johnson, met with General Westmoreland, had briefings at three of the four corps areas in South Vietnam, met with the commanding generals of the Marines in Danang and of the 173d Airborne Brigade at Bien Hoa. I talked with American colonels, captains and sergeants; with U.S. advisers to the Vietnamese army at all levels. I talked with the Vietnamese officers and men. For 3 days, dressed in fatigues and armed with a carbine, I talked with our troops all the way from the rice paddies of the Mekong Delta to the mountain command posts overlooking Danang.

While I certainly do not want to intimate that I could become an expert on Vietnam in 1 week, I do feel that I had the opportunity to learn a good deal more about the situation and our mission there.

In an effort to share my opinions on the war with my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert a speech that I gave last Saturday before the 45th Annual Convention of the Disabled American Veterans of Georgia, recording my thoughts and observations on the war.

In addition, Mr. Speaker, I have taken a special order this afternoon for the purpose of enlarging and detailing my remarks. I invite all my colleagues to join with me this afternoon in discussing the situation in Vietnam.

The speech is as follows:

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

(Speech of Hon. HOWARD H. CALLAWAY before the 45th annual convention of the Disabled American Veterans of Georgia, June 12, 1965)

The war in Vietnam is a different kind of war. It is in no way comparable to World War I, World War II, or the Korean war. This is the classic war of liberation. This is the kind of war that Mao Tse-tung and his Chinese Communists understand and want to fight all over the world. This is the kind of war that Mr. Khrushchev praised in his famous speech of January 6, 1961; it is the kind of war that Castro's Che Guevara describes in the field manuals that are being circulated today throughout Latin America; and this is the kind of war that will break out all over the world if we allow it.

A war of liberation is a phantom war that we hardly understand. It can best be described in Mao Tse-tung's words that "Our guerrillas will swim in a sea of peasants." Mao's classic war of liberation has three phases: the first phase is entirely guerrilla action. In the second phase the guerrillas group together in units of company to regiment size, attack and then fade away. The third phase is conventional war in which the guerrillas actually seize territory.

The war with the Vietcong today is in the second phase. Vietcong troops assemble almost at will in strengths up to regimental size, attack or ambush, and then vanish. They never stand to fight against superior forces, but always melt away into the sea of humanity. They live off the land, which is not difficult, for around each village there are coconut trees, fruit trees, and hundreds of pounds of rice stored in each home.

This is a war of terror. A standard Vietcong tactic is to attack a village in which the villagers have been friendly to the Republic of Vietnam or to the United States, and assassinate in a cruel fashion those who have cooperated. In 1964 alone, some 500 village chiefs were assassinated and more than twice that many kidnaped. This points out the obvious necessity of giving security to each of the villages. It is hard to get people to stand up for us when we can't protect them.

While this war has many aspects of a civil war, of Vietnamese fighting Vietnamese, I want to point out strongly that the Vietcong are supplied and directed totally from North Vietnam and Hanoi. Over 20,000 hard-core Vietcong are known to have come down the Ho Chi Minh trails into South Vietnam. They have trained, recruited, and kidnaped some 60,000 local Vietnamese into the Vietcong service; arms and ammunition are supplied from Hanoi. Most of these are light armaments such as 60-millimeter mortars, 57-millimeter recoilless rifles, and a new series of 7.62-millimeter small arms weapon. A significance of the new weapons is that they are manufactured in Communist nations and are of a different caliber from anything our forces are using. This means that the Vietcong are now so sure of their lines of supply that they no longer need to rely on captured weapons, but can count on supplying their own. Most of the weapons come in junks and sampans down the coast from North Vietnam.

How can Americans fight such an alien and unfamiliar type of war? The war is being fought today primarily by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, ARVN. They are fighting it first with regular troops, quickly meeting VC attacks before they can

disappear. Helicopters are being used extensively and the ARVN is continually developing new successful techniques. But primarily the war is being fought by a program of rural reconstruction. This program has replaced the strategic hamlet program and has the same purpose of providing security to friendly villages.

The Vietcong controls a very large part of the territory of South Vietnam, but the Republic of Vietnam controls most of the large population centers in all of the 45 provinces. The idea of rural reconstruction is to start with the population center already controlled, and then like a spreading drop of oil, move out slowly taking more and more areas under the control of the Republic of Vietnam. As this control spreads, regular army ARVN forces are replaced by both regional forces, and by popular forces who together secure the areas from the Vietcong. As soon as an area is secure civilian government is established in cooperation with the armed forces.

This is how the Vietnamese are fighting their war, and it seems to me a very sound method of fighting it.

And what are we doing to help? First of all we are providing advisers at all levels to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. In each of the four corps areas there is a senior American adviser, a full colonel. He works hand in hand with the Vietnamese corps commander giving tactical advice, helping with training, and coordinating the American Air Force units. Similarly, American advisers are working side by side with division, regimental and battalion commanders as well as with province chiefs and district chiefs.

This program is working extremely well. Of the hundreds of advisers I saw, each worked in close cooperation with his Vietnamese counterpart. The Americans had nothing but praise for the Vietnamese Army and for the courage and fighting ability of the Vietnamese soldiers.

The one problem with the Vietnamese Army is that of leadership. During their tenure, the French did not train native leaders, and it is only now that leaders are being trained. This takes time, but wherever there is good leadership, the Vietnamese soldiers fight well. In the few instances where they have not fought well, it has always been attributed to poor leadership. One significant example was of a battalion in a heavy fight recently that was doing extremely well until its battalion commander was killed. As there was no one to step in and take over the leadership, the battalion fell apart. Our advisers are playing a significant role today in providing and training the necessary depth of leadership.

In addition to advisers, we are also fighting the war with operational American troops. We have the 3d Marine Division whose mission it is to protect the three airfields of Phu Bai, Danang, and Chu Lai in the northern part of the country, and the 173d Airborne Brigade stationed near Ben Hoa and operating in that area. These are conventional American troops with specific missions such as the protection of airfields. We have to realize that our troops are operating as guests in a friendly sovereign country. This is frustrating at times, but the problems are being worked out as the spirit of cooperation is strengthened between the two nations. For example, when the marines first came into Danang they were assigned to a sector much too small to carry out their mission of defending the Danang Airbase.

Yet as the marines have operated and showed the local Vietnamese that they are careful not to harm any of the civilian population, their sector of responsibility has been increased.

Our third tactic in fighting this war is to interdict the Vietcong supply routes by air

strikes north of the 17th parallel into North Vietnam. Generally the air attacks are held below the 20th parallel, with only an occasional strike above that line. Although our pilots are encountering antiaircraft fire, and from time to time lose aircraft, the strikes have been quite effective in cutting supply lines in this limited area. But the real problem is that the Vietcong needs such a small amount of supplies, using no petroleum and no food and very little ammunition. It has been found that if we knock out a bridge one day the next day supplies are routed around to ferry sites. Therefore, these strikes are effective, in that they are making matters more difficult for the North Vietnamese, but they in no way stop the supplies that are needed for the Vietcong. Most of the supplies eventually find their way to the Vietcong by sea and rivers in junks and sampans.

My assessment of the war in Vietnam is that under the present circumstances we are winning. This month we are in better shape than we were a month ago, and a month ago we were in better shape than we were 2 months ago. In each of the Provinces, the area under control of the Republic of Vietnam spreads out week by week. The Vietcong seems to be maintaining its strength, but it is getting no stronger. And added to this is the encouraging fact that the morale of both American troops and Vietnamese troops is extremely high. As a matter of fact, most of the commanders that I talked with felt that morale was higher than they had ever seen it in any operation in war or peace. We can be extremely proud of our fighting men.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From my brief visit I would make the following recommendations:

1. I think that we should do everything we can to explain to our people that this is a Vietnamese war and not our own. Our role is only to help, not to take over. Certainly it would be a great mistake to get into the position of fighting a major ground war on the mainland of Asia. I hope that with our help and advice, the Vietnamese troops will be able to control the Vietcong without U.S. operational forces and that perhaps within the next year all U.S. forces except advisers might be pulled out safely.

I say this even as additional U.S. operational troops are being moved into Vietnam. I support the move of additional troops as necessary to protect ourselves against the threat of a new kind of war, an attack by regular operational armed forces. Should this war in Vietnam change from the present war against the Vietcong to a different kind of war against regular forces of North Vietnam, China or Russia, then we would have to analyze the situation and change our plans accordingly. I cannot speculate on what our reaction to such an event might be, but I hope that it would be firm, and with the full consideration of all of the resources at our command. I might say in passing that in some respects a war against an overt aggression would be easier to fight than the present one.

But I return to my point that the war against the Vietcong guerrillas should be fought by the Vietnamese, not by U.S. operational troops. We should continue to help the Vietnamese with advisers, military and economic assistance, and most of all with training and leadership; but we should let them fight their own war, which with our help they are perfectly capable and willing to do. Let me say that in the role of advisers and helpers, I think we are committed to a long-range program of many years duration.

2. We should consider a change in the ground rules for bombing north. There are new and dangerous military targets in the Hanoi area. Specifically, the I-28 Russian jets and the SAM missiles. I would hope we would consider bombing these military tar-

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gets within the next few days. This is a decision that only the President can and should make, and its implications are great. Yet there is perhaps more danger involved in allowing establishment of these sites, ultimately inviting Russian jets to attack us in South Vietnam and Russian missiles to shoot down our planes, than to destroy these military targets promptly and eliminate their danger.

3. We should consider some kind of political solution whereby the free world would gain from the war in Vietnam. As it is now, Ho Chi Minh, the North Vietnamese leader, can at any moment call a halt and negotiate according to the 1954 Geneva agreement which divides the country into North and South Vietnam. In that event, we would be back right where we were, and then after a month or 6 months, the North Vietnamese could start the war all over again. As the situation now stands, the North Vietnamese have nothing to lose but everything to gain and thus it is to their advantage to continue. Thus the free world will have to set an objective beyond returning to the status quo. Perhaps we will have to make some plan for liberating North Vietnam from Communist control so that the rulers in Hanoi will know that they do have something to lose. Until then I see very little hope in stopping their aggressions.

My final comment is that we in America can be extremely proud of our fighting troops. They are fighting the most difficult war that can be imagined in the finest traditions of our Nation. Let us at home be firm, and give them the backing that they deserve for if we do they will never let us down.

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION AND THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION

(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, the situation in amateur athletics is seriously embroiled in what appears to be irreconcilable conflict between the Amateur Athletic Union and the National Collegiate Athletic Association. I have written the President, and hope many Members would do likewise, urging his intercession to resolve the controversy, possibly by the appointment of a special blue-ribbon commission.

I believe it would be very unfair if our young athletes should suffer by not being permitted to compete in various track and field meets because their elders are arguing over who has jurisdiction over them.

We have an international track meet with the Soviet Union coming up this year. At the National AAU meet, scheduled for June 26 and 27, participants will compete for places to represent our Nation. It would be unfortunate and unforgivable if because of this disunity between the AAU and the NCAA our best athletes were prohibited from competing for places by the administrative default of those who seek to be responsible for the conduct of amateur athletics. For example, the widely heralded Randy Matson, of Texas A. & M., who has broken the world's shotput record, would be foreclosed from competing in the National AAU meet, unless something is done. And of course

this would also apply to a host of other college and university star performers.

What is needed is a blue-ribbon commission, headed by someone like the late Douglas McArthur, whom President Kennedy had appointed, to bring these two organizations together and agree on binding arbitration of their differences, and I call on the President to take immediate and appropriate steps. Time is of the essence.

ANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL BALLGAME

(Mr. CONTE asked and was granted permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, as you know, it will soon be time once again for the Republicans to assemble their baseball team at District of Columbia Stadium to claim our annual victory over a similar group of sports from the other side. I speak, of course of the annual congressional game scheduled for the end of this month. I wish to take this opportunity to again invite the Speaker and the minority leader to be our guest of honor on June 30, 1965.

I am pleased to serve once again as coach, manager, and star player for the Republican team. Although we are badly outnumbered and have been in recent years, I am confident we will again demonstrate that superior skill has more to do with the outcome than superior numbers.

That undoubtedly has a great deal to do with the events I wish to relate here this morning, events concerning a rather startling piece of treachery on the part of our opponents. In spite of their overwhelming manpower advantage, our opponents have again been reduced to underhanded guerrilla warfare in an effort to stave off certain defeat again this year.

They have attempted to shanghai one of our most promising prospects this year, my learned colleague and honorable gentleman from Tennessee, the heavy-hitting JOHN DUNCAN. My colleague was invited to sign with the other team in a maneuver reminiscent of the infamous "Black Sox" scandal of 1919, and the ill-fated attempt by one of our Latin American neighbor countries to lure our big league stars away from us after World War II.

I consider this an act of treachery and underhanded perfidy that goes against all our American traditions of sportsmanship, statesmanship, and collective bargaining. I must admit I am seriously considering a formal protest before the House Un-American Activities Committee.

I am stunned by the audacity of the learned manager of the other team who, by this act, demonstrates his contempt for the national pastime and for the skills of his colleagues. I must say in all fairness, however, that he is able to recognize a loser when he has one and I can understand his earnest desire to help his cause no matter what the risk or the possible consequences.

I am confident that truth and justice,

in the resplendent uniforms of the Republican team, will win out in the end.

Mr. Speaker, I have dispatched the following letter to the manager and playing coach of the Democratic team, the Honorable HARLAN HAGEN:

DEAR HARLAN: It has just come to my attention that in spite of your overwhelming manpower advantage the Democratic forces have again been reduced to psychological warfare with regard to the annual Democratic-Republican baseball game. The underhanded attempt to sign the Honorable JOHN J. DUNCAN away from the Republican squad has been paralleled only by the notorious Black Sox scandal in the annals of baseball history. Remembering the so-called "secret strategy" charges of last year, however, the above act of aggression does not seem inconsistent with prevailing Democratic policy.

This is to notify you that an official protest will be lodged before the House Un-American Activities Committee at the earliest possible convenience. The dedicated loyalty of Representative DUNCAN and the other Members of the outnumbered but never outplayed minority team leads me to expect a glorious victory on June 30, repeating last year's 6-to-5 triumph by an even greater margin.

Again, such tactics from a man of your noted baseball ability are both shocking and injurious to the reputation of our national pastime, but truth and justice (in the uniforms of the Republican ball club) will win out in the end.

Competitively yours,

SILVIO O. CONTE.

YOUTH ACHIEVEMENT PROGRAM OF POUGHKEEPSIE EXCHANGE CLUB, DUTCHESS COUNTY, N.Y.

(Mr. RESNICK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RESNICK. Mr. Speaker, I would like at this time to recognize the contributions of the Poughkeepsie Exchange Club in Dutchess County, N.Y., for its fine record of interest in the youth of our Nation.

Cognizant of the fact that the top ranking scholars receive ample recognition through scholarships and other awards, this club for several years has sponsored a youth achievement program. The ground rules for the selection of outstanding students to be recognized were set as follows.

He or she must be a well rounded person exhibiting not only a superior scholastic record but a record of contribution and leadership in such things as sports, clubs, student government within the school, and scouting, 4-H, church, charities, etc., within the community as well.

Nine Dutchess County high school students, five girls and four boys, have been selected for this honor. Their names are: George Hritz, John Bernard Kane, Jr., Thomas E. Albro, Julia Hunter, Karen Mae Creswell, Nina Busick, William Sleeper, Maryellen Bagiackas, and Marilyn G. Tanner. Their individual records of accomplishment and community interest constitute a fine example of the achievement of the youth of our Nation. The delinquents and dropouts receive a great deal of attention in the national press. But it is good medicine to

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look at the other side of the picture. The great majority of our students take their education seriously. And a gratifying number of them, in addition to their academic accomplishments work just as hard on their development as good citizens. Because it is important to provide recognition to the youth of our country, who are concerned with their responsibilities to society, I am proud to introduce this statement into the Record, honoring both the students and the Poughkeepsie Exchange Club.

FE *Callaway*
VIETNAM

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. CALLAWAY] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Speaker, I have just returned from a week that will stand out in my memory as one of the most vivid and rewarding weeks of my life. I have just returned from a 1-week trip to South Vietnam. Certainly, as all Members realize, there is no way to become an expert on any problem as complex as the problem of the Vietnamese war in 1 week. I do not claim to be an expert, but I do feel that I had an unusual experience which I should like to share with you, my colleagues.

I had the opportunity to hear briefings at the highest level in Saigon—from Ambassador Johnson and from the officers of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. I met with General Westmoreland. I had the opportunity of going to all of our operational units—to the 3d Marine Division in Da Nang and to the 173d Airborne Brigade at Bien Hoa. I received briefings at both of these places.

I also went out with our patrols on the ground and talked with our enlisted men as well as our officers. I went into three of the four corps areas in South Vietnam, and at each of these places I talked with and was briefed by the commanding officers and their staffs.

Further than that, particularly in the Mekong Delta rice paddies, I had an opportunity to go out on an operation that had just taken place, and I talked to men who had been only moments before engaged in combat with the Vietcong.

I had a unique opportunity that perhaps some of my colleagues will not be able to share, in that as a graduate of the West Point class of 1949, I found, wherever I went, many old friends and old classmates who, of course, were only too willing to share their experiences with me.

I hope that as I discuss what I saw in Vietnam those of you who wish will join me in colloquy in these discussions this afternoon.

The first and foremost impression I received from Vietnam is that this is an entirely different kind of war. This is unlike what we in this country think of as war. It certainly bears no relation to the trenches of World War I or the hard conventional fighting of World War II. I would like to say it even bears no resemblance whatsoever to the war in Korea. This war today being fought by the Vietcong is what the Communists

call a "war of liberation." This is the kind of war Mr. Khrushchev spoke of so glowingly in his famous speech of January 6, 1961. It is the kind of war Mr. Che Guevara, Castro's man, writes field manuals about—field manuals that are now being used in training guerrillas from Latin and South America. It is the kind of war espoused by Mao Tse-tung and about which he speaks when he says, "Our guerrillas will swim in a sea of peasants." My point is that this is an entirely different kind of war from anything we have fought. It is the kind of war where our major and first problem is to find an enemy who merely evaporates and goes out of sight. Because this is a new kind of war, a "war of liberation," it takes on a special importance. Every single senior officer I spoke with in Vietnam told me that this is a war we must win. This is the classic "war of liberation." This is the war that all Communist leaders have told us we will be having throughout the world. If the Communists win, we can expect immediately similar wars not only in southeast Asia where we all hear of the domino theory but throughout the entire world, particularly in Africa and Latin and South America.

The people with whom I have talked said with all conviction that the very moment the Chinese, the Russians, and the North Vietnamese think that they can win this "war of liberation," other "wars of liberation" will start throughout the world. By the same token, if we in this country can show to the people of the world that we can win on the continent of southeast Asia, in the backyard of the Communists, then we will certainly go a long way toward stopping these wars throughout the world.

This classical war of liberation is fought in three phases. The first phase is strictly guerrilla warfare with very small units. In the second classical phase, the guerrillas get together in company, battalion, and even regimental size to attack, then fade back into the sea of humanity. In the third phase of the conflict, the guerrillas mass and actually seize and hold territory. Today in South Vietnam we are in the second phase. The Vietcong control about half of the actual land of South Vietnam. They can mass anywhere in this territory at regimental strength and sometimes with the strength of two to three regiments. They can mass, they can hit hard, they can ambush, and they can do their devastation. When our troops come to fight, unless they come quickly, the Vietcong have evaporated and are completely lost. You cannot find them. They live off the terrain. It is very easy to do, because in the places I saw, particularly in the southern part of the country, every village is surrounded by coconut and fruit trees, and in each home there are hundreds of pounds of rice stored the year around. It provides the perfect setting for guerrillas to live off the land and melt in among the peasants and villagers.

I would like to point out also that this is a war of terror. You have heard, as pointed out in the State Department white paper, that 500 village chiefs have

been killed in 1964 alone and over twice the many kidnaped. These are village chiefs. Many times that number of just plain civilians have been killed, kidnaped, and captured. Five hundred may not sound like so many, but if we think of the equivalent of their population to our population, it is the equivalent in 1 year of 20,000 U.S. mayors killed or kidnaped. This is a genuine war of terror.

These people were killed or kidnaped for the sole reason that they had been loyal to us or to the Republic of Vietnam or had supported our program. So it is obvious that we cannot be effective in Vietnam unless we give these loyal Vietnamese our protection.

There were a few little things that made me aware of the unique nature of this war. First of all, I was able to go on a civilian passport. More than that, at the airport in Saigon, while I was taking off in a Marine C-54, on the runway just landing was a Pan American civilian 707. Three planes behind me was a Hong Kong Airlines plane going to Hong Kong; immediately in front of me was an Army F-100 armed with bombs, taking off for a mission, and between my plane and the Hong Kong plane were two South Vietnamese Air Force planes going into action against the Vietcong. Civilian planes took off along with Air Force fighters going out to do their job.

And to further point out the difference between this and other wars, I was told that Vietnamese nationals travel from one end of the country to the other, through Vietcong territory daily on a routine basis on local buses. There were Vietcong inspection check points, paying charges, and so forth.

I point this out to show that there are no front lines. This is certainly a mixed-up kind of war, from our viewpoint.

When you speak of the Vietcong you often think of men loosely joined together, but they are much more than that. I found that the Vietcong have their own government, they have their own mayors, and they collect taxes. Surprisingly, they have their own APO numbers for their troops and have even been known to issue war bonds.

In some ways it is like a civil war because you have Vietnamese fighting Vietnamese. But I would say without question that this is not a standard civil war, because the Vietcong is supplied, furnished, and controlled from Hanoi. There is no question about that. The State Department White Papers have referred to 20,000 known Vietcong who have come down over the Ho Chi Minh Trails from North Vietnam. We know that they have recruited or kidnaped at least 60,000 men from South Vietnam to join their hard core units. So they have a Vietcong force of almost 100,000 now in South Vietnam.

And while this does not seem to be too many, the traditional or classic rule for fighting guerrillas is that conventional troops need to have at least 10 times as many people as the guerrillas in order to hold them.

I have said that the Vietcong are completely supplied today from Hanoi. They have no munitions factories. They have

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no way of getting weapons. They are no longer capturing the weapons that they need. The supplies come from Hanoi and are carried mostly by sea in junks, sampans, and different kinds of small vessels.

Many of the major rivers in South Vietnam are controlled by the Vietcong.

It is an interesting thing to see the use of these rivers. In the Mekong Delta there are over 2,000 miles of rivers and canals with a navigable depth of 6½ feet. This is more than the total of the roads and navigable trails in that same area, and the Vietcong controls a great deal of this waterway.

I would like to point out that they need very little in the way of supplies, however. They need no food whatsoever. They need no oil or gas of any kind. The only supplies they really need or receive in quantity are 60-millimeter mortar ammunition, 57-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition, and weapons somewhat similar to our .30 caliber weapons.

One of the interesting things is that they have just been supplied with new and modern 7.62-millimeter weapons made in the Communist countries. Our ammunition will not fit any of those new weapons. They must be sure of their source of supply from Hanoi, because in the past they have relied heavily on captured ammunition, which will no longer be useful to them.

Mr. Speaker, my point then is that this is a new and different kind of war. The question is how do we fight it. The way that we fight it is basically with the Regular Army of the Republic of Vietnam called Arvin, Army of the Republic of Vietnam. We fight it in conventional ways where possible. We fight it particularly well with helicopters. As the Vietcong ambushes and moves fast, we try to use everything we can to strike back quickly. Sometimes we catch them and destroy them. The difficulty is finding the enemy.

Mr. Speaker, the Vietcong operates almost entirely at night. We have had to set up clever ambushes in order to catch them at night. This phase of the operation is going better and better. Our air strikes, coupled with those strikes of the Vietnamese Air Force are doing an extremely effective job against the enemy. We have complete superiority of the air there now.

But, Mr. Speaker, the basic program for winning the war in Vietnam is one that is called rural reconstruction. This replaces the old "strategic hamlet" concept and yet is serving the same purpose. While it is true that the Vietcong controls a great deal of the territory of Vietnam they control very few population centers.

There are 45 provinces in Vietnam, the province being the nearest equivalent to our State. All provinces have population centers under the control of the Republic of Vietnam.

The rural reconstruction program starts with the population centers already under control. The plan then is to move out from these population centers like spreading drops of oil, little by little, until the spreading centers join the entire country as one. They move first

with regular army troops. The troops clear out the Vietcong and set up a good civilian government. Then they recruit and train civilians into regional forces and popular forces, whose duty it is to protect the villages after the regular army unit moves out.

Obviously, Mr. Speaker, the whole problem is to secure these areas and grant the protection that is needed.

I would like to say that this program is working well and that our area is expanding in every province that I visited.

This is the basic way that the war is being fought by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, what is the role of the United States in this operation?

Basically, our role is as advisers. We have active advisers at every level, Americans who are working with the Vietnamese troops. We have a full colonel as a senior adviser to each Vietnamese corps. We have officers at the division level, the regimental level, and the battalion level who are training side by side and fighting side by side with the Vietnamese troops. Our advisers live, eat, and sleep with their Vietnamese counterparts.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to say that I have heard nothing but the highest praise for our men who are serving and living under severe conditions to which they are not accustomed.

Mr. Speaker, the Vietnamese are good soldiers. Our men praise them. They are hard fighters. They are brave. They are taking extremely heavy casualties and continuing to fight. But they have one real overriding problem; the problem of leadership.

During their tenure in Vietnam, the French did not train native leaders. Certainly we are doing so now, but this takes time, and meanwhile, the lack of native leadership poses a big problem.

A striking example of this was one battalion fighting in the Second Corps area. The battalion was doing extremely well, until the battalion commander was killed, and then the group went completely to pieces and was routed. There are not enough qualified replacements to take the place of men killed.

This poses the biggest problem to our advisers. These men are building Vietnamese leadership but I would like to point out it is an extremely long range program.

In another phase of the war, we are attacking the North with our aircraft. We are attacking basically from the 17th Parallel that divides North and South Vietnam to the 20th Parallel.

There have been effective attacks on bridges, barracks, and major military targets in this area; the purpose of which has been to interdict the supply routes of the Vietcong. But the Vietcong's needs are small. One Defense Department official told me they could be supplied with some 3 tons per day. It is inconceivable that 3 tons could supply the entire area, but I have said that they use no gasoline, no food, and only very light weapons. We make it difficult, but we do not stop the supplies. If we bomb out a bridge, they simply ferry the ammunition across the river. We are hin-

dering them; we are giving them trouble, but they are getting through with the small supplies that they need.

This is the basic situation in Vietnam as I see it: Our advisers are working well; the Vietnamese are fighting well. Basically, we are winning the war.

I have not spoken of the second kind of war which, to many, appears to be imminent at any moment. This is the overt kind of war where we would face operational troops from North Vietnam, China, and even from Russia. This is a much more serious kind of war. But it is a war we are better trained and equipped to fight. At least you can find the enemy. In order to be prepared to fight this kind of war, we have introduced our own operational troops commanded by American officers. An example is the 3d Marine Division. They are protecting airfields in the northern part of the country and they are protecting us against the threat of armed operational troops from North Vietnam.

We have the same situation with the 173d Airborne Brigade. They have the mission of protecting us from the possibility of attack by operational troops. We know, as it has been announced, that additional U.S. operational troops will be sent to Vietnam soon.

I would like to say this poses a whole lot of new problems when we put in our own troops, rather than advisers. You notice this everywhere you go. We have the problem of fighting in a friendly nation in which we are only guests. We cannot do as we did in Korea, for here we have a sovereign nation. This creates a lot of problems, but I can say that by cooperation the problems are being worked out and I hope they may be solved by now. If we should find large numbers of operational troops of China, Russia, and North Vietnam moving into the area, I cannot speculate on what we could or should do. I would hope, if this should happen, that we will answer such a threat with resolve and firmness and will consider the use of all of the power at our command to answer it.

As a result of this trip and of the things I did see in a week, I have come up with some recommendations.

The first recommendation is that we should realize that the Vietcong is being fought by the Vietnamese with the assistance of our advisers. It is not our war. This is a Vietnamese war and our units should be used as advisers to help train the Vietnamese.

I want to say again that I do support sending operational troops into Vietnam because I feel it may be necessary to protect our interests against other operational troops. But the long-range war against the Vietcong guerrillas should be fought by the Vietnamese. They are willing and capable of fighting their own war and with the help of our advisers and support they can continue to do that.

I would like to say in this regard that I hope our operational troops will be able to come back to our country in a short time—within a year or so. But I see no hope that our advisers will be able to come back within a short time. I feel

that this is a long-range war. We are still in Korea today and we may still be in Vietnam 20 years from now.

My second recommendation is that we should now consider bombing additional military targets in North Vietnam. We know that Russia has the IL-28 jets near Hanoi and the jets have a capability of bombing us in South Vietnam today. We know of the SAM missile sites in the same region. Either today or shortly, we may have jets bombing our bases and ships and missiles shooting down our aircraft.

It seems to me that the President, whose decision it must be, must consider promptly the advisability of attacking these military targets. Some will say that this will escalate the war. But, in my opinion, there will be a much greater escalation of the war if we do not attack these targets and if we allow them to build in strength to the point of bombing us and shooting down planes—that to me would be the greater escalation.

A third recommendation is that we consider some kind of political solution whereby the free world would gain from the war in Vietnam. As it is now, the leaders of Hanoi have nothing to lose. Whenever they feel they may be losing the war, they can merely say that they will live up to the 1954 Geneva agreement, since this is apparently our objective. They only need to say "we will stop breaking our word and stop trying to destroy South Vietnam." Since this is our apparent objective, we would stop our participation in the war on this basis as a great victory. But would it be a victory?

In a month, or 3 months, or 6 months, when the time was right, the leaders of Hanoi could start down the trails again to supply the Vietcong.

All we are now asking for our expenditure of American money and our expenditure of American lives is for Hanoi to go back and do what they have already promised to do. But if we should have a further objective, then the situation would change. Suppose we should adopt as our objective a "unified Vietnam free from Communist control." We would then have something to win and conversely the leaders of Hanoi would have something to lose. I should think that our strength at the bargaining table would be greatly strengthened by such an approach.

My fourth and final recommendation is a personal one to my colleagues. I hope that each of you will take the opportunity, if it is available, to go to Vietnam. Certainly, in the short time that any of us can give up to go there, one cannot learn all there is to know about any nation or any problem as complex as this, but I do feel that even in a short time there is a tremendous amount one can do and learn, and that such a trip would be most valuable.

Finally, I should like to say that we can be proud of our troops in Vietnam. The morale is higher than I have ever seen it anywhere. All the leaders tell us this. They are doing the job. As of now, against the forces we are now fighting, we are winning.

Mr. O'NEAL of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield

Mr. CALLAWAY. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. O'NEAL of Georgia. I commend my distinguished colleague from the Georgia delegation for his enlightening and comprehensive report on the situation in Vietnam. It is a mark of service above and beyond duty when a U.S. Congressman pays his own expenses to gain firsthand knowledge of our efforts in southeast Asia.

Above all, it is a mark of patriotism for an elected official to devote valuable time and accept personal risks in order to be of greater service to his constituents and to his country.

It is indeed reassuring to hear Mr. CALLAWAY's factual report. I feel that the gentleman is more qualified than most of us to make such an authoritative report on the subject before us today. He is a graduate of West Point Academy with a bachelor of science degree in military engineering. He has also served as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Army Infantry.

While no man can predict with certainty what the future course of events in southeast Asia will bring, the gentleman from Georgia has given us an informed account of particular significance in the light of recent occurrences.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, I should like to commend the gentleman from Georgia for a fine presentation today. What he said has been an inspiration to all of us.

It is certainly refreshing to me to have the firsthand knowledge the gentleman obtained on his trip to Vietnam.

I also wish to commend the gentleman for paying his own way. In this day and time when we seem to spend the taxpayer's money like it is going out of style, this also is refreshing, to find a man interested enough in what is going on in the world to pay his own way to go over to find out for himself.

I am sure the report the gentleman has brought back to the House will be of immeasurable value not only to Members of Congress but also to the Department of Defense.

I thank the gentleman for presenting us this report.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman for his kind remarks.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin, the distinguished conference chairman.

Mr. LAIRD. I wish to concur in the remarks made by the gentleman from Alabama and the gentleman from Georgia in commending the gentleman on his fine report of his trip to Vietnam. I believe it calls to the attention of all Members of Congress the responsibility we have to examine carefully the position of our Government in this area of the world.

It is my hope that in the next few weeks we can have further public discussions about the position we occupy

in southeast Asia and the overall policy decisions which have been made.

This afternoon we are reporting the defense appropriation bill from the Appropriations Committee. Many of us on that committee are concerned about the inadequacy of the budget which was sent to us for the Department of Defense, to cover the expenses of that Department in the fiscal year 1966. Time and again witnesses before the committee from the Department of Defense and from the three services indicated to us that the guidelines which were set forth for drawing up this budget did not take into consideration the escalation which has taken place in Vietnam after the President made his decision to go North, as far as the Air Force was concerned, in the latter part of calendar year 1965.

We have already had one supplemental budget request totaling some \$700 million sent to the Congress, and I would predict that in January, or early in the next calendar year, we will have another supplemental request to cover the costs of the Vietnamese operation.

It would seem to me that all of us in the Congress should be made aware of one fact: the budget which was sent to us supposedly was under \$100 billion as far as estimated expenditures at the first of this year are concerned, and that budget showed a reduction in defense spending so that other domestic programs could be funded at a higher level without breaking through the \$100 billion ceiling. Yet that budget did not take into consideration these increased Vietnamese activities. They set a budget ceiling of \$100 billion while at the same time they knew full well with the Vietnamese operation going as it was that further requests would be made of this Congress in order to fund this particular operation. The highest priority as far as the expenditure of the taxpayer's dollars today is concerned is in the area of national security. The commitment that this country has made as far as southeast Asia is concerned and, yes, throughout the world in this area of national security should have the No. 1 place as far as our Government is concerned.

Therefore I say, as we proceed down the line, we will find that this budget document with the \$100 billion ceiling, which was hailed all over the United States early in January, had no consideration given in it to the stepped-up activities which were already in the works at that particular time. This is something that we should discuss and that the American people should be made fully aware of.

I thank the gentleman from Georgia for yielding to me.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

I would like to say that I agree with the gentleman and, as one who has consistently supported the President's policy in Vietnam, I certainly think that we should certainly watch carefully anything this important to this Nation.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

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Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to join my colleagues in commending the gentleman from Georgia for the very informative and comprehensive report which he has given to us. The gentleman has done the House and the country a service in making this report on his brief but very fruitful visit to South Vietnam.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman for his kind remarks.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me. I want to join, too, in commending the gentleman from Georgia, who has a great deal of personal knowledge and experience in the military field, on his comments and for making his trip. I think we have all found his observations helpful. I was particularly impressed by the fact that, as he just remarked, his observations as he comes back do not differ very significantly from the established policy of our Government. He did recommend an extension of bombing to more military targets in the north, but at the same time, if I understand him correctly, he indicated that he recognized some of the complexities that were involved in making that kind of a decision.

If the gentleman will yield further, I would like to ask him a question with respect to his first recommendation, which I did not understand entirely. If I understood the gentleman correctly, I understood him to say there was some distinction between the fight going on there now and the fight over the ultimate political control of the territory. He suggested, if I understood him correctly, that in one area we should help the South Vietnamese, but in another area the fight should be left up to the Vietnamese themselves. I am afraid I do not quite understand that, because it seems to me basically these two struggles are the same. In fact, those who are now proposing that we pull out of Vietnam are the loudest in suggesting that what is going on there is really only a civil war and that we should leave that war to the Vietnamese themselves. I am sure the gentleman did not intend to subscribe to that point of view, but I wonder if he could make his point again, so that I might understand it more clearly.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman very much.

First of all, I would like to say that he is entirely correct in that I do support the present policy in Vietnam. I had the opportunity to meet this morning with Secretary McNamara on that subject and we found ourselves almost in complete agreement.

You are correct that I have recommended some further actions in the north, particularly bombing military targets, further than our administration is doing today. I feel that should be considered by our President. To that extent we have differences, perhaps, but in the main I support our effort in Vietnam and think it is being handled extremely well and much better than press reports give us reason to believe.

I especially want to thank the gentleman for referring to my first recommendation. I am sorry I did not make it clear. My intent was to state my conviction that there are two entirely different kinds of war that we may be called upon to fight in Vietnam.

The first is the war against the Vietcong which we are fighting today, and which the Communists call a "war of liberation." It is my opinion that this can best be fought by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, with the advice and help of our people, stressing the training for leadership, which is a long-range program.

In my opinion, we will be there a long time fighting this particular war against the Vietcong.

Apparently, the main reason that we are sending in so many U.S.-commanded operational troops as I understand it, is to protect against the possibility of a great influx of operational troops from the enemy, be it North Vietnam, or whoever. This, to me, is a different kind of war which must be fought by our operational troops in order to be successful.

I do not believe that the army of the Republic of Vietnam can take care of that. We must fight it. So there are two different kinds of war.

My recommendation was that if we continue to fight this Vietcong style of "war of liberation," that we pull out our operational troops or do not use them, but rather use the Vietnamese troops who are willing to do the fighting and that we provide them the training.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further to me, would the gentleman not agree that what he refers to as the Vietcong war is also a war that has very largely been created by the infiltration of troops from outside South Vietnam? I wonder if the gentleman would not agree that what we are seeing in Vietnam is not really two different kinds of war, but rather the gradual extension of this initial infiltration, with operations conducted entirely on a guerrilla basis, now moving to a point where these same operations, though still conducted by the same Vietcong, who have actually infiltrated down from the North, are beginning to resemble a conventional, infantry-scale type of war?

The gentleman is not suggesting, is he, that we would be willing to let this Vietcong operation be expanded to the point where South Vietnam itself might fall before such an attack? Do we not have an obligation to defeat this kind of infiltration, in whatever form it comes, so as to secure the liberation of South Vietnam, because for us to do anything less would be to negate our own commitment and let this vital area fall to the Communists?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I agree with the gentleman wholeheartedly. I would like to say that the Vietcong would fall and would have fallen long ago without support from Hanoi. So it is not a true civil war. It is totally financed, supported and instigated by North Vietnam.

My distinction was perhaps a military one. I feel that as long as we are fighting the Vietcong in this present situation, where they attack and evaporate, use

light weapons and use no trucks or aircraft, then the Army of the Republic of Vietnam can and should handle the fight. But if we move into an area of conventional war, with conventional frontlines, heavy 105-millimeter howitzers, trucks and tanks and aircraft and traditional frontline equipment, then I think we have a war that operational troops would have to fight.

Mr. MacGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. MacGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman, particularly, as I understand it, from what the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. O'NEAL] said that the trip to Vietnam was made at his own personal expense; is that correct?

Mr. CALLAWAY. That is correct.

Mr. MacGREGOR. May I ask the gentleman whether that was on a private commercial aircraft or was it on the basis of reimbursement for use of the Military Air Transport Service of the U.S. Government?

Mr. CALLAWAY. It was on a regularly operated commercially scheduled airline. You just buy a ticket as you would if you were to go to Chicago.

Mr. MacGREGOR. Does the gentleman have any idea how much more expensive it was to travel, as the gentleman from Georgia did, on a private commercial carrier from Washington to Saigon as opposed to reimbursement on MATS on a space-available basis?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I do not know the difference in cost.

Mr. MacGREGOR. It is fair to say, I am sure, that the cost of the gentleman's travel on a private commercial carrier was more expensive than it would be on a basis of reimbursement to the Government for a space-available seat.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I feel certain it is.

Mr. MacGREGOR. If the gentleman will yield further, may I ask the gentleman whether or not any official in the Department of State or the Department of Defense or the Executive Office of the President extended to the gentleman the opportunity to ride on a space-available basis on MATS aircraft?

Mr. CALLAWAY. No; they did not.

Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. RHODES of Arizona. I want to congratulate the gentleman for having made his trip. I want to state that in November of 1964, as a member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, I also went to Vietnam. At that time I was taken by helicopter to a small village which was surrounded by Vietcong territory. I talked to the people who were the residents of the village. This was a village which had been overrun by the Vietcong about 3 weeks before we got there. You could still see the scars from the battle. In fact, almost all of the people who survived had relatives who had been killed, wounded, or kidnaped at the time of the Vietcong attack.

This, certainly, I am sure the gentleman will agree is a heart-rending sort of war. It is very difficult terrain. It is

hard for the people who are combatants, but it is harder for the people who are dependents of those who are fighting.

Mr. Speaker, I know the gentleman joins me and I am sure the other Members of the House hope that the end of this war will come more clearly in sight than it now appears to be, and that we will continue to do what is necessary as far as our national commitment is concerned to the cause of the free world, and that we will be able to aid the South Vietnamese to bring this whole matter to a conclusion which will be a victorious one for the cause of freedom.

When I came back, I said that the prime need in Vietnam was for a stable civilian government to run this war. I still say so. I hope our Government will bend every effort to help such a government to evolve.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I think the gentleman from Arizona and I certainly agree with the gentleman.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I shall be happy to yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I wish to commend my distinguished colleague from Georgia for the interest he has taken in the problems of Vietnam and I would like to ask the gentleman whether, while he was in Vietnam, he developed any evidence of the Communist Vietcong atrocities against U.S. servicemen, U.S. civilians in that area, and against the South Vietnamese servicemen or civilians including women and children?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I would like to say to the gentleman from Ohio that I did not develop any evidence on this. I, of course, saw where the Embassy was bombed in Saigon shortly before I was there. But I did talk to people who indicated that there were terrible atrocities, not only to village chiefs and people who might have some reason to be treated this way, but even brutal atrocities to women and children for no reason whatsoever.

I did not see this myself but I had reason to believe it is true.

Mr. FEIGHAN. If the gentleman will yield further, that is a matter I believe of deep concern to the people of the United States and the free world and I am very glad that under the leadership of our very able chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS], that committee is going to make a full investigation and present, as they should, this evidence to the people of the United States.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to say just one word further on the atrocities that are taking place all the time. In those areas in which the people show loyalty to us, children are actually kidnaped from their mothers and fathers, and enlisted into the Vietcong to fight their countrymen against their wills.

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. PICKLE. I would like to join my colleagues in commending the gentleman

from Georgia for this trip and for this very fair and factual report which the gentleman has given to the Members of the House today.

Mr. Speaker, I listened with a great deal of interest to the report and I have profited from it, as I am sure all Members on both sides of the aisle have profited from it.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to state that, of course, the recommendations which the gentleman has made are his individual recommendations, but I believe the gentleman has given us a better insight as to the problem which exists in Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman for his report.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MIZE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. MIZE. I want to join my colleagues in complimenting the gentleman for this fine report.

I want to get it clear with reference to the morale of our troops which the gentleman states is high, is that correct?

Mr. CALLAWAY. It is not only high, but it is in the opinion of every single commander that I asked, higher than they have ever seen it in any other war.

Mr. MIZE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I would like to thank the gentleman from Kansas for bringing this out because I do not think we get the feel of that from the press. May I say that I talked to a young captain who had been up fighting all night. He was tired, and bearded, his radio was strapped on his back, and he was covered with mud. I asked him, "How do you like it out here?" And his first word was "Great."

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CALLAWAY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. YOUNGER. I would like to join with my colleagues in thanking the gentleman for making this trip and giving such a fine report of it. I am not sure all of the Members realize that the man in the well is also a graduate of West Point, so that he is giving us from his training and his experience something that we rarely get here on the floor.

I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman for his kind words. I do not pretend to be an expert on this. But I do recommend to my colleagues that they go to Vietnam; I think that those able to make the trip will profit greatly.

I would like to stress again that our morale is high. Both the Vietnamese and the Americans feel they are doing an important job and I feel they are doing it well.

WE NEED A TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH IN URBAN MASS TRANSPORT, NOT JUST BETTER INTERCITY RAIL TRANSPORT

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. REUSS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to remind my colleagues of the very serious state of transportation in our Nation's cities.

Soon we will be asked to approve a \$20 million research and demonstration program to design a new high-speed intercity ground transportation system along the Washington-Boston, or northeast corridor. This program will be focused on travel between cities despite the greater demand which exists for good public transportation systems within the cities themselves.

As a cure for the intraurban transportation problem, we are instead relying on the Mass Transit Act of 1964. But this act can do little more than help cities purchase new buses or replace worn-out subway cars. No substantial research is being sponsored by the Federal Government in an attempt to develop new, dynamic systems which will provide urban dwellers with good public transport.

We should be spending at least as much on research to provide whole new systems of moving people about within our cities rapidly, safely, economically, and efficiently, as we are on research into other modes of transportation.

It is rather like concentrating all one's efforts on saving the dying dogwood tree—beautiful as it is—and neglecting the withering oak which provides the real strength of our forests. We should be working to save both.

Today, nearly three-quarters of our population lives in urban areas. All of these people must move about in the cities in which they live. They need quick, economical, and safe ways to get to work, to shop, and to visit. They cannot forever depend on existing transportation systems. Therefore, it is the responsibility of our Government to promote the development of systems which will supplement existing methods.

In view of this need, I am today introducing H.R. 9200 to amend the Mass Transit Act of 1964. The measure would require the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency to undertake a research program aimed at achieving a technological breakthrough in the development of new modes of urban transportation.

The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. ASHLEY]; the gentleman from Texas [Mr. CABELL]; the gentleman from New York [Mr. MULTELL]; the gentleman from New York [Mr. ROSENTHAL]; the gentlewoman from Missouri [Mrs. SULLIVAN]; the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VANIK]; the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. WELTNER]; and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. YATES] are introducing identical bills.

The text of H.R. 9200 follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 6 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 is amended by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d), and by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

"(c) In addition to projects undertaken under subsection (a) the Administrator shall undertake a program of research designed to achieve a technological breakthrough in the development of new kinds of public intraurban transportation systems which can transport persons in metropoli-

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The OAS even has persuaded the leaders of the military junta to promise that none of them will run in the elections.

Both sides in the civil war probably will continue to drag their heels whenever they can, but firm action by the OAS gradually will overcome that handicap. At the moment, even though the situation remains serious and difficult, the prospects are brighter than might have been expected a few days ago when confusion was in command.

For this, on reflection, we can thank the original decisiveness of President Johnson in sending U.S. troops—which undoubtedly prevented an even worse slaughter of Dominicans than occurred. And the patience and persistence of Mora and his OAS associates in negotiating the understandings now seemingly being achieved.

THE WASHINGTON, D.C., MEETING ON OCEAN SCIENCE AND OCEAN ENGINEERING

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, a most outstanding 4-day meeting has just concluded here in Washington. The meeting was remarkable for two reasons: first, it was concrete evidence of a great surge of activity in a field of primary importance for all Americans; and, second, because in spite of its significance, it passed almost unnoticed.

The meeting was on the subject of ocean science and ocean engineering, with dual sponsorship by the Marine Technology Society and the American Society of Limnology and Oceanography.

The Marine Technology Society is new—less than a year old. Its remarkable growth and achievement in less than a year are a tribute to its officers and directors, but—even more important—also to the fact that it has filled an important void in national organization, by providing an organization and forum for those who are concerned, not solely with obtaining knowledge from the seas, but with putting that knowledge to use in practical engineering terms.

The American Society of Limnology and Oceanography has a longer, but equally successful, history, and is devoted to the advancement of science in these fields. Perhaps some Senators find "limnology" a new word, as I did.

It is perhaps most conveniently defined by simply stating that a limnologist is to fresh water what an oceanographer is to salt water.

The chairman of the joint conference was the distinguished former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, and chairman of the Interagency Committee on Oceanography, Dr. James H. Wakelin, Jr., now president of the Scientific Engineering Institute.

The meeting was significant because it provided a meeting ground for scientists, engineers, and managers from the academic world, from private industry, and from Government. The subjects ranged from detailed studies of a single aspect of science or technology, such as "Variability in Marine Benthic Communities off Georgia" and "A Free Diving Oceanography Buoy," to broad topics, ranging from an assessment of mineral resources of the sea to a full day's discussion of the role of nuclear energy in the sea.

It was my privilege to be invited to participate in a panel discussion, on Wednesday evening, on "Organization of Oceanography and Ocean Engineering in the United States." My fellow panelists included such distinguished scientists as Dr. Roger Revelle, of the Harvard Center for Population Studies, who has been director of the famed Scripps Oceanographic Institute, and scientific adviser to the Secretary of the Interior; Dr. Paul Fye, director of the equally famous Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute; and Dr. Wilbert Chapman, of the Van Camp Foundation. Industry was represented by Capt. H. A. Arnold, of United Aircraft Corp.; and David Potter, director of the General Motors Defense Laboratories. Other panelists were Representative PAUL ROGERS, of Florida, an articulate and informed champion of a forward-looking, national program for development of the oceans; and Dr. Wakelin. The moderator was one of the most energetic and imaginative men of my acquaintance—the distinguished scientist and engineer, Dean Athelstan Spilhaus, of the University of Minnesota.

A great deal of the discussion centered on the role of the Federal Government in ocean development; and when my own time came for a summation and final comment, I asked for a show of hands from those supporting each of three points of view that had been expressed during the evening:

First. No further action by the Government is necessary, in addition to that already being taken.

Second. A self-liquidating commission should be established of a composition that would enjoy the confidence of the Executive, Congress, industry, and the academic community. The commission would be charged with proposing a national policy in ocean development, together with the plans and suggested organization for carrying it out.

Third. The Government should move at once to establish an appropriate agency or other entity for ocean development.

I should note that the second proposition is consistent with a bill introduced in the other House by Representative Rogers, and the third is consistent with a bill introduced by the distinguished Senator from the State of Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON]. In my view, the two approaches are not at all incompatible. Among the attendees, there seemed to be a substantial body of opinion that the kind of entity proposed by Senator MAGNUSON was realistic, coupled with a view that the step proposed by Representative ROGERS was a desirable preliminary, in order to refine definitions, problems, and the role of the organization to be created.

On the show of hands, only a sprinkling of attendees—about 10—expressed the view that government need not take further action. The majority preferred the establishment of a commission or other study group, representative of all major constituents of an ocean program, to conduct a preliminary examination in depth, and to make recommendations for a positive policy and for an action program. Those who preferred immedi-

ate establishment of a new Federal agency for ocean development were a close second in number.

I do not regard any of this as definitive, but I think it is indicative of a lively interest in the future of the oceans. If there was a single point of consensus, it was that America must move forward in ocean development, and that this is a joint responsibility of Government at all levels, industry, and the academic community.

It is also important to note that several discussants sounded a note of caution, as follows. We should not move forward without first defining our goals and examining all the implications of those goals. Vast as the seas may be, they are not an endless resource, unless husbanded. We must be not only energetic and skillful, but also wise in our approach to the coming age of ocean development. We must foresee the consequences of our actions.

My own views on this point are clear. It was with this cautionary approach in mind that, on May 7, I spoke to the Senate about the possible establishment of sea-grant colleges. We did not know how to use the land profitably for agriculture until the great age of agricultural development in science and technology was spearheaded by the mixed scientific and technological approach of the agricultural institutions. I believe—and many of the others present at the meeting seemed to agree—that we must create a similar mechanism for the transfer of knowledge into practical applications, before we can exploit the oceans in a similar productive manner, while maintaining the principles of conservation.

Within a short time, I intend to introduce proposed legislation designed to meet this need. Meanwhile, my own State of Rhode Island already is looking ahead, thanks to the foresight, skill, and imagination of our own land-grant college, the University of Rhode Island, in developing courses in ocean science and engineering specifically designed to meet the State and national need.

FE

VIETNAM

Harris

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, the situation in Vietnam continues to require calm and deliberate patience and perseverance on the part of the people of the United States, as we continue to give our aid and assistance against aggression which threatens the people and security of the world.

Recently, Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY made at the National War College an outstanding speech in which he called for patience and persistence on the part of all Americans, and said:

Liberals must learn that there are times when American power must be used, and that there is no substitute for power in the face of a determined terrorist attack. Conservatives must learn that in defeating a Communist insurgency, the use of military power can be counterproductive without accompanying political effort and the credible promise to the people of a better life.

In a speech last week at Michigan State University, the Vice President dealt with the "curious misconception"

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that the Vietcong are a purely idealistic movement, not living on fear and terrorism.

I ask unanimous consent that an editorial on these two speeches by the Vice President, published in the Baltimore Sun on Monday, June 7, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TERRORISM

Vice President HUMPHREY suggested last week, in a speech at the National War College, that liberals and conservatives should modify their traditional positions on the use of military power to help weak or struggling nations to defend their independence against Communist subversion and attack. "Liberals," he said, "must learn that there are times when American power must be used, and that there is no substitute for power in the face of a determined terrorist attack. Conservatives must learn that in defeating a Communist insurgency the use of military power can be counterproductive without accompanying political effort and the credible promise to the people of a better life."

The Vice President was emphasizing, as he said, that Communist terrorism cannot be defeated "by good works alone, or by good intentions, or by slogans, or by propaganda alone." He said further that Americans must learn to be patient—"the Communists are very patient"—and must learn to persist, because the Communists are persistent, too.

"We must learn to adapt our military planning and tactics to the new conditions of Communist warfare," Mr. HUMPHREY added, "and we must learn to coordinate military efforts, propaganda, effective political organizational efforts and economic investments far better than we have done so far."

In another speech last week, made at Michigan State University, the Vice President dealt with what he called the "curious misconception" that in Vietnam the Vietcong is a great idealistic movement with some resemblance, for example, to the American Populist Party. In fact, however, he said the Vietcong has made its gains in South Vietnam largely from terrorism. Arthur Schlesinger, whose own qualifications as an American liberal are as authentic as Mr. HUMPHREY's, said the Vietcong's gains "have come in the main not from the hopes they have inspired but from the fear they have created." Agricultural stations have been destroyed, medical clinics raided, malaria control teams killed or kidnapped. Since 1954, according to estimates cited by Mr. HUMPHREY, more than 10,000 civilian officials have been killed or kidnapped.

These comments on the war in Vietnam are worth keeping in mind as the news dispatches describe the fighting and as the discussion of our policy continues in the United States.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, an editorial entitled "The Great Paradox," published in the New York Herald Tribune on June 6, points up some of the facts of our changing world concerning our relationship with the Soviet Union and Red China. I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE GREAT PARADOX

President Johnson calls on the Soviet Union to join the United States in works of peace, while evidence accumulates that Russian guns and planes are moving into North Vietnam. The Soviet Union complains that

Johnson talks peace while bombing a Communist country.

The situation is paradoxical. But the contradictory elements in the two national positions are real. There is no reason to doubt that both Washington and Moscow would prefer more stable relations with one another—and there is equally no reason to question the reality of the clash in Vietnam. The United States is deeply committed there; so is the Soviet Union. Americans had hoped that the Russians would use their influence to end the intervention of the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam; Russians want the Americans to pull out.

Vietnam is not the only corner of the earth in which American and Soviet interests clash, nor does either nation make any particular secret of the fact that the Russians want communism to spread and the Americans want it to roll back. But what was once a worldwide confrontation, with dangers of overt hostility at every point on the periphery of Communist power, has altered profoundly. Much of the frontier symbolized by the Iron Curtain has been stabilized; the curtain itself has been perforated in spots, with trade and communication barriers lowered. Berlin and Cuba are peril points, but even there the dangers are likely to spring more from the ambitions of Castro or the fears of the East German Communists than from the Soviet leadership.

This lessening of many acute tensions could lead, not to a firm peace (for the political and economic systems of East and West are still too far apart for that) but to a kind of *modus vivendi*, an agreement to disagree, that would permit a far more normal life for both superpowers, as well as for the nations that live in their neighborhood. But—there is also Red China.

Mao's China is all that the Soviet Union was in the days when Stalin ruled over a nation, victorious in war but gravely damaged by it. Peiping has many material wants, plus the consciousness of having survived a great ordeal, proud, secretive, suspicious, aggressive. It proclaims permanent revolution, expands its empire, and adds to this explosive mixture a racialist aspect that finds appreciative echoes in many of the new nations.

To this hungry predator, the Soviet Union—whose people are intensely desirous of enjoying the fruits of their own long and bloody struggle—is linked by ideological ties. The fact that Red China has made the United States its great foe, the symbol of all that is evil in the world, the enemy against which it unites its people virtually from the cradle, is Moscow's prime embarrassment in seeking any accommodation on any subject with Washington.

The Soviet leadership hopes to avoid a choice; it would like the United States, by bowing out of Vietnam, to make one unnecessary. But even that would not solve the Moscow-Peiping problem. For sooner or later the choice will be forced on Moscow—perhaps not over Vietnam, possibly not over any matter in which the United States is directly concerned. Because it is really Russia, not America, that China is contending with even now.

THE WHITE HOUSE FESTIVAL OF THE ARTS, AND THE NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES ACT OF 1965

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, thanks to the leadership and understanding of President and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson, June 14, 1965, was a day deeply significant to our Nation's cultural progress and growth. On that day, the White House festival of the arts was held. It

was a festival of unprecedented scope, and demonstrated not only the great variety of our country's artistic talent, but also this administration's desire to help foster, in every appropriate way, excellence in the arts.

The program was most comprehensive, and gave fitting emphasis to the broad spectrum of the arts: poetry, prose, drama, dance, music—both instrumental and vocal—painting, sculpture, photography, and the arts of the motion pictures.

Mrs. Johnson was a particularly gracious hostess to the more than 400 guests; and in her opening remarks she set the tone for this remarkable event when she called it a day of feasting for the eyes, ears, and minds of those who participated.

As the President said in his address of welcome to the artists assembled:

You seek out the common pleasures and visions, terrors, and cruelties of man's day on this planet. You help dissolve the barriers of hatred and ignorance which are the source of so much pain and danger. In this way you work toward peace which liberates man to reach for the finest fulfillment of his spirit.

Other great American Presidents have spoken eloquent words in behalf of our Nation's artists; but this was an occasion of unusual depth and magnitude, representing our past achievements in the arts, as well as contemporary works of importance.

As chairman of the Senate Special Subcommittee on Arts and Humanities, I pay special tribute to the President and to Mrs. Johnson for so splendidly bringing to the White House the wide diversity of our creative talents; and I am very happy to note that just 4 days before the festival, the Senate passed the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965.

This bill contains the President's proposals for the Foundation. As I have said before, I believe the bill is the most comprehensive of its kind ever to come before Congress. Thus, the concepts of the festival and those of the Foundation are in close and meaningful harmony. Both are, indeed, unique in the history of our country.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 237. An act to make certain provisions in connection with the construction of the Garrison diversion unit, Missouri River Basin project, by the Secretary of the Interior; and

H.R. 485. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Auburn-Folsom south unit, American River division, Central Valley project, California, under Federal reclamation laws.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (H.R. 3165) to authorize the

establishment of the Pecos National Monument in the State of New Mexico, and for other purposes.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED OR PLACED ON THE CALENDAR

The following bills were each read twice by their titles and referred or placed on the calendar, as follows:

H.R. 237. An act to make certain provisions in connection with the construction of the Garrison diversion unit, Missouri River Basin project, by the Secretary of the Interior; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H.R. 485. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to construct, operate, and maintain the Auburn-Folsom south unit, American River division, Central Valley project, California, under Federal reclamation laws; placed on the calendar.

EXCISE TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1965—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 8371) to reduce excise taxes, and for other purposes. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PELL in the chair). The report will be read for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read the report. (For conference report, see House proceedings of June 16, 1965, pp. 13354-13355, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I have the honor to bring before the Senate the conference report on H.R. 8371, the Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965.

This is the bill that only the day before yesterday was passed by the Senate. I think you can see from this that the conferees acted with expedition. In fact I might take time to point out that the whole handling of this bill, I believe, sets some kind of a record for quick action. It was exactly 1 month ago today, on May 17, that the President first sent to Congress his recommendations for excise tax reductions.

This is an indication of the speed with which Congress can act on tax legislation when there is a need to do so. All of us were aware of the fact that any delay in action on our part might affect the economy through the delay of purchases of the taxed articles by consumers. In my view, this demonstrates, and demonstrates quite clearly, that when there is general agreement in Congress that a tax reduction is needed, this action can be taken—in the regular legislative manner—in a very short period of time.

The bill, as agreed to by the conferees, does not depart to any appreciable extent from the bill as passed by the Senate the day before yesterday. This is indicated by the fact that the bill as initially passed by the Senate would, over

a 4-year period, have reduced excise tax collections by \$4,658 million. The bill, as agreed to by the conferees, is a reduction of \$4,676 million which constitutes a difference of only \$18 million from the bill passed by the Senate 2 days ago.

Actually, there are 108 numbered amendments in this bill. However, most of these are in the clarifying or conforming categories. In terms of substantive amendments, I count 29 amendments. However, of these, eight represent minor technical amendments recommended by the Treasury staff and our own technical tax staff. Apart from these, of the remaining 21, the conferees for the House receded on 13, 3 with significant amendments. The Senate conferees receded on eight.

Of all of the amendments, I would classify five as the most significant.

Two of these dealt with the manufacturers' excise tax on automobiles. As Senators will recall, the bill reduces this tax to 7 percent this month and then to 6 percent on next January 1. On January 1, 1967, the Senate version of the bill would reduce the tax to 5 percent and then on the following two January 1's, 1968 and 1969, there would be two additional reductions of 2 percentage points. Thus, the Senate would retain a tax of 1 percent at all times. The House would remove this tax entirely. This 1 percentage point under the Senate version of the bill would be set aside by the Senate bill in a special fund to aid in the disposal of old and wrecked automobiles.

In addition, 4 percentage points of the reduction in the tax on passenger cars was made contingent, in the Senate version of the bill, by the Ribicoff amendment, upon cars meeting the same safety standards as are required by the General Services Administration with respect to cars purchased by the Federal Government.

The House conferees, although we urged them earnestly to accept the amendment relating to car safety, refused to do so.

The conferees debated the amendment for more than an hour. We did not agree. We took a recess and then debated it again. We proposed a compromise. However, the House was absolutely adamant on this amendment.

They made it clear that in resisting this amendment they were not opposing these standards of car safety as such, but rather objected to their being made a condition to a tax reduction. They seemed to believe that if action was taken in this respect, it should be taken directly by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Senate Committee on Commerce. For that reason we had acceded to the House in this regard.

With respect to the 1 percentage point set aside for old and wrecked automobiles, the House agree to retain this 1 percentage point of tax. They refused, however, to earmark it in a fund for the disposal of old and wrecked automobiles. This, of course, does not mean that this 1 percentage point—or, for that matter, the other 4 points not to be repealed until after 1967—cannot be used to meet problems raised by

automobiles. This amount, for the present, will remain in the general fund revenue. This, of course, will not at some future time foreclose the allocation of this amount to the problems raised by automobiles, whether for safety, for the disposal of old cars, or other problems related to automobiles.

It will be recalled that the Senate version of the bill moved up the effective date for the reductions which, under the House bill, were scheduled for July 1, 1965. The Senate version of the bill provided that all of the retailers' taxes which are repealed, all of the manufacturers' taxes scheduled for repeal or reduction on July 1, and the playing card tax, instead of being repealed on July 1, are to be repealed on the day after the day the bill is signed by the President. The House agreed to this amendment and, therefore, the effective dates of these reductions will be the day after the bill is signed. I believe it is clear that this bill will be presented for signature to the President within the next few days.

Mr. President, I am somewhat embarrassed by a report that appears in the press. I am not certain whether the reporter who reported the statement heard it accurately. He said that the Senator from Louisiana said that the President would sign the bill on Friday.

As a practical matter, a suggestion had been made by the executive branch that the conferees should undertake to tell the President when he should sign the bill. The conferees unanimously agreed that it was none of our business to tell the President when he should sign the bill. That is his privilege. [Laughter.] He does not even have to sign it; he can veto it if he wishes to do so. That is purely a matter within his discretion. But somehow the press misunderstood the junior Senator from Louisiana. All I said was that if the President wanted to do so, he could sign the bill on Friday. I hope that that will straighten out the problem, because it has caused some misunderstanding between the executive and legislative branches of the Government.

I call the attention of the retail and wholesale trades to the fact that these reductions are about to occur and that if they hope to obtain floor stock refunds for their inventories on hand on the tax elimination date, they must be prepared to take these inventories as soon as the President signs the bill.

That is perhaps the reason why the President might delay signing the bill for a few days, in order to give retailers a chance to take inventory. It would be fine with this Senator if the President were to sign the bill on Friday so that the tax cut would go into effect on Saturday. In that way, everyone selling cuff links, cologne, men's perfume, or television sets could advertise, "Buy a television set for daddy on Father's Day." [Laughter.]

It would seem to me that would be a fine way to do it and to stop the buyer's strike. However, that is up to the President. One way would favor the retailer and the other way would favor the kids. The President will make that decision.

A fourth substantive amendment made by the Senate related to the tax on lubricating oil. The Senate bill would have

IMF: Authorizes an increase of \$1,035 million in the U.S. quota in the International Monetary Fund, from \$4.125 to \$5.16 billion. Public Law 89-31. (Presidential recommendation.)

Inter-American Development Bank: Authorized a \$750 million increase in the U.S. contribution to the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank—over a 3-year period at the rate of \$250 million a year. This represents the U.S. share of a planned \$900 million increase in the Fund which will serve to strengthen multinational aid and the Alliance for Progress. Public Law 89-6. (Presidential Recommendation.)

International Cooperation Year: Expressed the sense of Congress with respect to the 20th anniversary of the United Nations during International Cooperation Year. Senate Concurrent Resolution 36. Senate adopted June 16.

Peace Corps authorization: Authorizes an annual appropriation of \$115 million for fiscal 1966; provides two additional associate directors; and provides that the Director of the Corps shall hold no other additional office of an equal rank while serving as Director of the Corps. S. 2054 passed Senate June 2. House Calendar. (Presidential recommendation.)

Religious persecution: Expresses the sense of Congress against persecution of persons by Soviet Russia because of religion. Senate Concurrent Resolution 17 adopted by Senate May 14.

Saigon chancery: Authorizes \$1 million for the construction of a chancery in Saigon. Public Law 89-22. (Presidential recommendation.)

United Nations Charter amendments: Increases the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15 and the membership of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27, to be elected on a geographic basis. Executive A ratified June 3. (Presidential recommendation.)

Wheat agreement extension: Extends the International Wheat Agreement to July 31, 1966. Executive B ratified June 15. (Presidential recommendation.)

U.S. domestic fishery resources: Authorizes the President, whenever it is determined that fishing vessels of a foreign country are operating to the detriment of U.S. conservation programs, to raise the duty on fishery products of the offending nation. S. 1734 passed Senate May 19. Returned to Senate May 20.

JUDICIAL

Illicit traffic in child adoption: Imposed Federal criminal sanctions on persons engaged in interstate or foreign commerce in the illicit traffic of placing children for adoption or permanent free care. S. 624 passed Senate March 22.

PRESIDENCY

Presidential succession: Proposed constitutional amendment fixing conditions and procedures for succession of Vice President to the Presidency in event of Chief Executive's disability; provides for filling vacancy in the Vice Presidency. Senate Joint Resolution 1 in conference. (Presidential recommendation.)

REORGANIZATION

Bureau of Customs: Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1965 provides for the modernization of the Customs Bureau by abolishing the offices of all Presidential offices and establishing these positions on a career basis. Offices abolished are 45 collectors of customs; 6 comptrollers of customs; and 1 appraiser of merchandise and 1 surveyor of customs. Effective May 26, 1965. (Presidential recommendation.)

Reorganization Act extension: Extended for 4 years to June 1, 1969, the authority of the President to transmit reorganization

plans to Congress. S. 1185. Public Law 89-. (Presidential recommendation.)

RESOURCE AND RECREATION BUILDUP

Agate Fossil Beds National Monument: Authorized \$315,000 for the establishment of the Agate Fossil Beds National Monument in Nebraska. Public Law 89-33.

Assateague Island National Seashore: Provides for the establishment of the Assateague Island National Seashore in the States of Maryland and Virginia. S. 20 passed Senate June 17. (Presidential recommendation.)

Bighorn Canyon National Recreation Area: Authorized \$355,000 to establish the Bighorn Canyon National Recreation Area in Montana and Wyoming to provide for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of the proposed Yellowtail Reservoir, and for the preservation of the scenic, scientific, and historic features of the area. S. 491 passed Senate February 10. (Presidential recommendation.)

Federal Water Project Recreation Act: Established prospective standard guidelines on the allocation and reimbursability of recreation, fish, and wildlife costs on Federal multiple-purpose water resource projects. S. 1229. Conference agreed June 14. (Presidential recommendation.)

Fisheries Loan Act: Extends for an additional 5 years the fishery loan program administered by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries; expands the scope of the present program to permit a loan to be made regardless of whether the vessel to be acquired will replace an existing vessel; and removes the present minimum annual interest rate of 3 percent and substitutes a formula for establishing the interest rate. S. 998 passed Senate June 16.

Flood protection: Authorizes the Federal Government to bear up to 5 percent of costs of utility relocations on projects covered by the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act when the local organization is unable to bear such costs or cannot do so without undue hardship. S. 199 passed Senate May 25.

Grand Coulee third powerplant: Authorizes \$364,310,000 for Federal construction of a third powerplant at Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River in the State of Washington, which will add 3.6 million kilowatts of generating capacity to the 2 million kilowatts of the two existing plants, making it the largest single hydroelectric development in the world. S. 1761 passed Senate June 16.

Kaniksu National Forest: Authorized up to \$500,000 from the Land and Water Conservation Fund to extend the Kaniksu National Forest to include lands necessary for the protection and conservation of the scenic values and natural environment of Upper Priest Lake in Idaho. Public Law 89-39.

Mann Creek reclamation project, Idaho: Authorizes an additional \$690,000 to complete the Mann Creek project in Idaho which, upon completion, will provide a supplemental water supply to 4,465 acres and a new water supply to 595 acres. S. 1582 passed Senate June 16.

Manson Irrigation unit, Washington: Authorized \$12.3 million for the construction and operation of the Manson Unit of the Chief Joseph Dam project. The Manson Unit has an irrigation potential of 5,770 acres of land, with half of the costs reimbursable. S. 490 passed Senate February 10.

Nez Perce National Historical Park, Idaho: Authorized \$630,000 for the purchase of 1,500 acres of land to establish the Nez Perce National Historical Park to commemorate, preserve, and interpret the historic values in the early Nez Perce Indian culture, the tribes' war of 1877 with U.S. cavalry troops, the Lewis and Clark expedition through the area early in the 19th century, subsequent

fur trading, gold mining, logging and missionary activity. Public Law 89-19.

Pecos National Monument, N. Mex.: Provides for the establishment of the Pecos National Monument in the State of New Mexico. H.R. 3165.

Pesticides: Amends the act of August 1, 1958 by continuing 3 years a study by the Secretary of Interior of the effects of insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, and other pesticides, on fish and wildlife for the purpose of preventing losses to this resource. S. 1623 passed Senate April 29.

River basin authorization: Authorizes an additional \$944 million for fiscal years 1966 and 1967 for 13 river basin plans previously approved by Congress. H.R. 6755. Public Law 89-

River basin planning: Authorized Federal grants of \$5 million a year in matching funds to States for State project planning over a 10-year period; sets up a Cabinet-level water resources council to coordinate river basin planning; and authorizes creation of river basin commissions for regional planning. S. 21 in conference. (Presidential recommendation.)

Saline water conversion: Provided for an expansion of the Federal program of research and development in the field of saline water conversion through authorization of an additional \$200 million in appropriations for the period ending fiscal year 1972. S. 24 passed Senate June 16. (Presidential recommendation.)

Southern Nevada water project, Nevada: Authorizes \$81,003,000 for the Federal construction of the southern Nevada water supply project, a single-purpose municipal and industrial water supply development to furnish water from Lake Mead to the cities of Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson, Boulder City, and Nellis Air Force Base. S. 32 passed Senate June 17.

Tualatin project, Oregon: Authorized up to \$23 million for Federal construction of the multipurpose Tualatin reclamation project in Washington County, Oreg. S. 254 passed Senate April 1.

Water Resources Research Act: Amends the 1964 Water Resource Research Act to authorize grant, matching, and contract funds for assistance to educational institutions in addition to State land-grant colleges, to competent private organizations and individuals, and to local, State, and Federal agencies undertaking special research in water resource problems. Authorizes \$5 million for fiscal 1966 and increases the authorization by \$1 million annually until the level of \$10 million is reached. The ceiling of \$10 million will remain thereafter. S. 22 passed Senate March 25. (Presidential recommendation.)

Yakima project, Washington: Authorized \$5.1 million for the extension, construction, and operation of the Kennewick division of the Yakima project with an irrigation potential of 7,000 additional acres (present irrigated acreage is 19,000). All but approximately \$135,000 is reimbursable. S. 794 passed Senate February 10.

SPACE

NASA: Authorized a total of \$5,190,396,200 to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for fiscal 1966 as follows: Research and development, \$4,536,971,000; construction of facilities, \$62,376,350; and administrative operations, \$591,048,850. H.R. 7717. (Presidential recommendation.)

TAXES

Motor fuel taxation compact: Grants the consent of Congress to New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia to enter into a compact relating to taxation of motor fuels consumed by interstate buses and to an agreement relating to bus taxation proration and reciprocity. Public Law 89-11.

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Excise taxes: Reduced excise taxes by \$4.7 billion. H.R. 8371. In conference. (Presidential recommendation.)

TIME

Uniform time: Establishes uniform dates for commencing and ending daylight saving time in the States and local jurisdictions where it is observed. S. 1404 passed Senate June 3.

TRANSPORTATION

Navigation: Increased authorizations for the support and maintenance of the Permanent International Commission of Congresses of Navigation. S. 1501 passed Senate April 21.

Oceanographic vessels: Exempts oceanographic research vessels from the application of certain vessel inspection laws. S. 627 passed Senate April 29.

VETERANS

Reopened insurance fund: Authorizes the Veterans' Administration to transfer up to \$1,650,000 from the veterans special term insurance fund, for the purpose of providing administrative expenses in connection with the reopening of national service life insurance. Public Law 89-40.

VA hospitals: Expresses sense of Congress on increasing the authorized bed capacity for all Veterans' Administration hospitals. Senate Concurrent Resolution 13 adopted June 4.

WELFARE

Older Americans Act: Creates an Administration on Aging, under direction of a Commissioner, within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to be a coordinating center for information and service to State and local governments, administer grants; promote research, gather statistics, and prepare and publish other data. H.R. 3708 passed Senate amended May 27.

National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities: Establishes a National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities to develop and promote a broadly conceived national policy of support for the arts and humanities throughout the United States. S. 1483 passed Senate June 10, 1965.

MISCELLANEOUS

Bank Merger Act Amendments, 1965: Amends the Bank Merger Act to require that future bank mergers should not be consummated until 30 days after the date of approval by the appropriate banking agency. S. 1698 passed Senate June 11, 1965.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished junior Senator from South Dakota such time as he may wish.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Oklahoma.

FE  VIETNAM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I believe that the war in Vietnam has taken a dangerous new turn with the commitment of large American land forces to a combat mission. Seventy-five thousand American soldiers are now committed to Vietnam, and every indication points to a total of at least 100,000 by next fall.

This in itself is a highly dangerous development, for it will inevitably invite a greater commitment of forces by the other side. The large North Vietnamese army which has thus far remained largely on the sidelines may be increasingly drawn into the fighting in the south. If that should happen on a large scale, it is clear that we would either be required to send in an army of several hundred thousand men or face a disastrous defeat or bloody stalemate out of all proportion to our interest in this

corner of the globe. Nor does this prospect rule out the possibility of a confrontation with the huge armies of China backed by Russian air power and modern military equipment.

Mr. President, let us be clear on one point before we take this course. Our present commitment of U.S. combat forces on a sizable scale in South Vietnam is a radical departure from the advisory and assistance role which has heretofore been enunciated by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and by Secretary of Defense McNamara.

In his original statement of U.S. aid to South Vietnam, President Eisenhower said on October 23, 1954:

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms.

On September 2, 1963, President Kennedy said:

I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Vietnam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort.

On August 12, 1964, President Johnson said:

The South Vietnamese have the basic responsibility for the defense of their own freedom.

In February 1964, Secretary of Defense McNamara told congressional committees:

I think we must recognize that success in the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam depends primarily upon the South Vietnamese themselves. It depends upon their ability to construct a stable government. It depends upon their willingness to fight. It depends upon the competency with which they are led. It depends upon the extent to which their government deserves and receives the loyalty of the people, and the support of the people. All of these conditions are conditions that additional men and equipment from the United States are not likely to advance.

These statements make it perfectly clear that we did not go into southeast Asia to fight a major war with American forces. We are now following a course which is sharply at variance with the advisory and supporting role previously spelled out by three Presidents.

Yet, dangerous as this prospect is, an even more foolish course is now emerging as the recommendation of certain Republican spokesmen who seem to be calling for victory over the Vietcong guerrillas by massive U.S. bombing attacks on China and North Vietnam.

Mr. President, how long will it take for some people to realize that bombing Hanoi or Peiping will have little or no effect on the guerrilla forces fighting a thousand miles away in the jungles around Saigon? These guerrillas have

lived for 20 years largely off the countryside. They have fought largely with captured weapons. Their strength is that they are a part of the people and the terrain in which they fight. They live with the villagers and the peasants and in many cases are farmers by day and fighters by night. To bomb them is to bomb the women and children, the villagers and the peasants with whom they are intermingled. To destroy their crops and jungle foliage is to destroy the countryside on which the general population depends. Thus, our bombing attacks turn the people against us and feed the fires of rebellion that strengthen the guerrilla cause.

In a recent U.S. bombing attack aimed at the guerrillas, newsmen reported that three out of four people seeking treatment after the raid for the cruel burns of napalm bombs were village women and children.

How much more ineffective it would be to start dropping bombs on the masses of humanity piled up in the cities of North Vietnam and China. This would not slow down the Vietnamese rebel forces thousands of miles to the south. It would simply destroy the moral and political influence of the United States in Asia. It would turn Asia into a seething sea of hatred against America from which we might never recover. It could insure a Communist takeover in southeast Asia and perhaps all of Asia and the utter collapse of American influence in that part of the world.

Instead of this futile course, I would urge that we take advantage of the forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers to encourage discussions with the Vietcong leaders in South Vietnam. Perhaps the Algerian hosts of this Conference could provide a useful contact with the National Liberation Front that speaks for the Vietcong. President Johnson has very wisely offered to enter into negotiations leading to an honorable settlement of the war without preconditions. The administration has, however, excluded the Vietcong from such negotiations. That exclusion may be unwise and may be the chief barrier to negotiations. After all, the principal antagonists in this struggle are the government in Saigon which remains in power with U.S. backing, and the Vietcong rebel forces which enjoy the support of Hanoi and Peiping. For us to insist that only Hanoi and Peiping can negotiate for the Vietcong is to presume a Communist monolithic bloc in southeast Asia that may be a creature of our own misconceptions. Nor do we have any claim to be the principal negotiator for South Vietnam. That is the function of Saigon. I sometimes think that the Government and the people of South Vietnam have been lost sight of in this strange and tragic war.

In any event, to refuse to include the National Liberation Front of the rebel forces in negotiations would be similar to King George III insisting 185 years ago that he would negotiate with our French ally but not with Gen. George Washington and his rebel American forces.

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I am told that the administration objects to discussions with the Vietcong because this might undermine the South Vietnamese government. But governments have been falling in Saigon with regularity every few weeks for the past 2 years. Furthermore, the government in Saigon has repeatedly expressed the fear that the United States is taking over the war so completely that it has the effect of undercutting the Saigon government in the eyes of its people.

If we are concerned about discussions with the Vietcong undermining the South Vietnamese Government and I think that is a legitimate concern—there are two safeguards we could follow. First, we could encourage the South Vietnamese Government to initiate such discussions with the Vietcong, or second, we could and should give assurances to Saigon that any negotiations in which we are involved will be in cooperation with our South Vietnamese ally.

As one respected American editor put it:

The administration's mistake hitherto has been to point to a door marked "unconditional discussion," which has also been marked, "no admittance for the Vietcong," thus inhibiting a response from any quarter. To take down that inhibiting sign calls for political courage by President Johnson—almost as much as was displayed by General de Gaulle when he proposed entering into peace talks with the Algerians. But the alternatives now seem reduced to two: American withdrawal without parley as demanded by Peiping and Hanoi, or the commitment to South Vietnam of several U.S. fighting divisions which will bear the brunt of 5 or 10 more years of jungle war.

Mr. President, before we drift or plunge into either of these unfortunate alternatives, I hope and pray that the Senate will engage in long and painstaking debate about the essentials of our present foreign policy. Do we intend to rush into every revolutionary situation in the world on the theory that we have a mandate to impose an American solution? Do we intend to work with or against the powerful nationalistic and social forces now convulsing Asia, Africa, and Latin America? Do we assume that all Communist or Socialist states are "one ball of wax" and that we must resist them all down to the last American soldier, or can we live in peace with "Titoist" type regimes, including, perhaps, even Ho Chi Minh? Will we forever insist on denying the existence of a government on mainland China—the most populous nation in the world? What is the role of the United Nations and other peacekeeping agencies in the trouble-spots of the world? How effective is military power in areas of overriding human misery, hunger, and disease? Do we understand the sources of Communist appeal to the neglected peoples of the world? Are we using our own strongest moral, political, and economic weapons including our food and technical know-how to the best advantage in our competition with the Communists? Is southeast Asia so vital to our interests that it is sufficient cause for us to undertake world war III in that part of the globe?

These are some of the many questions that I hope the Senate will debate before we are committed so irrevocably to a course in southeast Asia that all debate and discussion is stilled by marching feet and exploding bombs.

Mr. President, I add one final thought: Recent announcements that U.S. forces will engage in ground combat in Vietnam if requested by the Government of South Vietnam, comes at a particularly bad moment because of the continuing inability of that Government to get a grip on the situation.

If it were a question of the United States responding to a request for help from a government which was moving toward stability and control, that would be one thing. But the political standing of the Government of South Vietnam has grown weaker rather than stronger in recent weeks.

It is ironic that one newspaper—the New York Times—carried the story of the U.S. decision to allow U.S. troops to fight at the request of the South Vietnamese Government right next to a story about the expected fall of the South Vietnamese Government. This juxtaposition reemphasizes the fact that the problem in South Vietnam is first and foremost a political one. Military measures are also necessary at this time, but until a satisfactory political solution is reached in South Vietnam, military measures alone—bombings of North Vietnam, increased numbers of U.S. advisers, more modern equipment, or actual combat by U.S. troops—will not solve the problem.

There is a great contrast between the direction of U.S. policy in Latin America and in Asia. In the Dominican Republic, for instance, what began as a unilateral intervention is becoming more and more multinational and the responsibility of the Organization of American States. Yet, in South Vietnam, what began as a multinational enforcement of Geneva commitments is becoming more and more a unilateral intervention, in which even the South Vietnamese Government is playing a smaller role while the U.S. role continues to escalate.

I think we would be wise in Asia, as well as in Latin America, to avoid unilateral intervention and to work for multilateral support for our efforts. If it is impossible to get effective multilateral backing, I think that should be a clue to us that our policies and objectives may need reevaluation.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from South Dakota for his very thoughtful speech. I was not able to be present throughout the entire speech. I did not have the opportunity to read the speech prior to its delivery. Therefore, I am not prepared to say whether I agree with everything that was said. I believe that the speech was an extremely thoughtful contribution to the dialog on this very serious situation confronting us in southeast Asia.

All too frequently lately, I have noticed

that the columnists, editorial writers, radio and TV commentators keep insisting that any discussion of our involvement in southeast Asia will somehow or other be misunderstood over there, and, therefore, we should not talk too much about it over here.

My comment about that is that I do not believe that we should qualify our freedom and our freedom of speech in this country based upon what might be thought by people who never had any freedom or freedom of speech.

We should not give up our freedom or our freedom of speech in this country merely because they do not understand what it is about since they have never experienced it.

I commend the Senator for a thoughtful and courageous contribution to this dialog, which should continue in a free society such as the one in which we live and hope to continue to live for all time to come.

APPOINTMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM F. MCKEE TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7777) to authorize the President to appoint Gen. William F. McKee (U.S. Air Force, retired) to the office of Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, when President Johnson learned of the intention of Najeeb E. Halaby, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, to resign, he began searching for a man to fill this high post—a relatively new post in terms of Government agencies—yet a post which requires the highest skill and knowledge of the art of aviation, the tact and diplomacy of an ambassador in dealing with and melding the interests of general aviation, commercial aviation, and the military, and the experience in Government in order to work with the various other government agencies, State and Federal, on aviation affairs and to carry out the desires of the Congress.

In selecting men and women to hold high and responsible positions in our Government, President Johnson has chosen well. His search to find the best person for the job and his refusal to accept anything less, whatever the pressures upon him were, have set new standards for the quality of leadership in government.

The man President Johnson has selected to be the next Administrator of the FAA, is, as much as any other Presidential appointee, a tribute to the President's wisdom and firm adherence to his rule—"the best man for the job."

Because of a provision in section 301(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requiring the Administrator to be a civilian, it was necessary for the President to ask the Congress to authorize him to appoint William F. McKee, a retired Air Force general, to be the Administrator of the FAA.

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As a former Member of both Houses of the Congress the President is respectful of the prerogatives of the Congress and has conscientiously given great attention to the wishes of the Congress.

The bill to authorize the appointment of General McKee has been considered carefully by the Senate Commerce Committee and the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Public hearings were held by both committees and every interested person and organization were afforded an opportunity to testify. Both committees have registered their approval of the bill.

In substance, the bill waives in this one instance the requirement in section 301(b) that the Administrator of the FAA be a civilian. It permits General McKee to serve as Administrator and retain his rank as a retired Air Force general. General McKee would be entitled, as are all retired regular military officers, to receive a portion of his military retirement pay under the Dual Compensation Act in addition to receiving the full civilian salary as Administrator.

The bill expressly states:

[That General McKee] shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were not an officer on the retired list of the Regular Air Force.

The bill also expressly states the intent of the Congress that this is a one-time waiver of the requirement that a civilian serve as head of the Agency.

Any further action or waiver of this provision would require the passage of an act of Congress. Congress has done this, so far as the House is concerned. It is now up to the Senate to take some action.

I yield to the distinguished Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I rise in support of the pending legislation to authorize the appointment of Gen. William F. McKee. I do not support this legislation because General McKee is a military man. I support the legislation because General McKee is an able administrator.

On June 23, 1964, I made certain remarks in the Senate Chamber concerning General McKee on the occasion of his forthcoming retirement, which took place on July 31, 1964. I read from my remarks about General McKee on that occasion as follows:

I wish to use this opportunity to take note of General McKee's able work and constructive contribution in the Nation's service.

An outstanding management man, General McKee's assignment as commander of the Air Force Logistics Command, and then as Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, brought to fruition many improvements in the support system of the Air Force which he had planned and directed.

The activities supervised by General McKee included both personnel procurement and training, and the complex materiel procurement and supply operation required to support our combat air forces.

General McKee stated his objective for the modern Air Force as follows:

"As we move farther into space, there will be no room for error—mechanical or human. Our efforts today are aimed at the flawless support systems of tomorrow."

During his duty with the Air Force Logistics Command, management improvements resulted in a reduction in manpower from 224,000 to 147,000 and requirements for spare parts were reduced by some \$7 billion.

These increases in efficiency were not made by sacrificing support to the combat units. High-speed movement of priority and high-value material has reduced the inventory in the pipeline: use of electronic data processing equipment and improved communications can make requirements from the field quickly known; and maximum use of air cargo delivery methods and equipment can promptly provide the necessary equipment.

As vice commander of the Air Materiel Command, and later as commander of the Air Force Logistics Command, General McKee played a major role in eliminating the vast Air Force logistics complex overseas, which included large depots in Africa, France, England, Japan, and the Philippines. On his recommendation, a depot program for Spain, at a cost of many millions, was never built. As the overseas logistics complex was phased out, the Air Force went to a concept of direct support from the Zone of Interior. This resulted in very substantial savings in dollars and people. Perhaps more importantly, the combat effectiveness of our overseas units was significantly improved.

That is the end of the quotation from the statement I made on the Senate floor on June 23, 1964, in connection with the then pending retirement of Gen. William F. McKee from the Air Force.

He is an outstanding administrator. He is a man of great integrity. He has the confidence of the people of this country. He administered procurement programs in the Air Force running into billions of dollars without a word of doubt as to his able, dedicated, and outstanding performance in those critically important programs.

Mr. President, I support the legislation. I intend to support the nomination of General McKee. He is a man of great ability and I am convinced he will make an excellent Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield, with the permission of the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], who has the floor.

Mr. MONRONEY. I yield.

Mr. HARTKE. Assuming for the moment what the Senator has said is correct, without contradicting the high opinion that the Senator from Washington has concerning General McKee, does the Senator feel, in all fairness to the general himself and to the Senate, that before the rest of the Senate should pass judgment on this man he should not go through the customary and regular procedures of the Senate by coming before a committee and having an open hearing as to his qualifications rather than having only individual testimony of persons who know him personally? No such hearing has been afforded in this case.

Mr. JACKSON. I do not think that is the issue. It is only a matter of time. He will be required to appear before the Commerce Committee in connection with his nomination.

This bill simply makes it possible for the President to submit his nomination.

Mr. HARTKE. That is the very essence of the proposition. This is no general purpose bill. The bill is directed

to General McKee. Before the Senate passes the bill, it must pass judgment upon whether the man is qualified. The very essence of the question involved is that we are asked to pass a bill and to accept the judgment of some persons without being afforded the ordinary course of a hearing. In other words, we are asked to pass judgment on the Senate floor, then to have a hearing, and at that time pass judgment on the man for the second time.

Mr. JACKSON. I would not question for one moment the necessity of having General McKee appear before the Commerce Committee, however, I see no reason to require him to appear twice—particularly since he has not yet even been nominated.

Mr. HARTKE. Does the Senator want me to accept his statement as authority? I have respect for him, but I do not believe that, under similar circumstances, the Senator from Washington would want to dispense with hearings on the nomination of a certain person merely because I thought he was of the highest quality.

Mr. JACKSON. I only say that I stand on my statement. If the Senator does not subscribe to it, obviously, he does not have to do so. I notice that the Senator circulated a letter questioning whether General McKee is an administrator. I think what I have said is quite pertinent to the letter the Senator sent to every Senator. I was speaking only to this issue which the Senator raised in his letter.

Mr. HARTKE. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator said that 1 week ago he was speaking on this bill, and the distinguished majority whip asked him what unusual qualifications General McKee has which make him the only person capable of holding the job of Administrator. He stated that he did not know, inasmuch as the Commerce Committee had not had an opportunity to question General McKee.

I am not saying he is the only man. The point is that not only was he a great officer in the Air Force of the United States, but he has been one of the outstanding administrators in the Pentagon. I know that of my own knowledge. He is a man of great integrity.

I am trying to answer the question raised in connection with the letter.

Mr. HARTKE. I am not denying the authorship of the statement or the letter. The only question is whether the Senate is entitled to do away with organic law for one man. That is the first point. The second point has to do with the regular procedures of the Senate which would require the man to come before the committee and state his qualifications, and at the same time give members of the committee an opportunity for examination.

Mr. JACKSON. The bill before the Senate is a condition precedent to taking up his nomination. It simply enables the President to submit his nomination. We cannot nominate him. The President makes the nomination does he not? This is exactly what was done in the case of General Marshall. There is a precedent for it.

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Committee. It should be noted that the project has an excellent benefit-cost ratio of 1.5 to 1 for the initial phase and 1.6 to 1 for the ultimate phase.

The cost of this undertaking—some \$49 million for the initial phase—is completely reimbursable from revenues derived from the delivery of water to southern Nevada users, with interest. The Nevada State Legislature granted authority 2 years ago to the State's Colorado River Commission to contract with the United States for the repayment and to operate and maintain the project when it is in service.

This project has full and unhesitating support from every level of State and local government in my State and also from all responsible civic and business groups.

I urge support for this vital project so that the Congress can complete action on it as quickly as possible and hasten the day it can benefit the robust economy of southern Nevada.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I join my distinguished senior colleague from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE] in urging the Senate to act favorably on passage of S. 32 to authorize the southern Nevada water supply project.

My colleague has done yeoman's work in pressing for the enactment of this vital legislation and has eloquently outlined the need for the authorization of this vital project.

The growth and prosperity of Nevada and the entire Southwest is irrevocably tied to adequate water development. There is no doubt in my mind that the Congress realizes the critical need to move and move rapidly to meet the Nation's demand for water for the future.

This was illustrated just yesterday, Mr. President, when the Senate gave its wholehearted support to the passage of S. 24 to greatly increase the commitment of this Nation to accelerated research in the field of desalinization. I feel that a massive effort to advance desalting technology, the support of the Congress for various water development projects such as the project now before the Senate, and programs to finance research in weather modifications will help alleviate the water shortage problems that will face this Nation in the very near future.

The southern Nevada water supply project is designed to meet the very immediate needs of southern Nevada and on its passage rest the aspirations of an area of my State in which nearly 50 percent of the population resides.

All costs would be allocated to municipal and industrial water users and would be reimbursable by the beneficiaries over a 50-year period. It is important to point out, Mr. President, that the project has a first-stage benefit-cost ratio of 1.5 to 1, and a favorable ratio of 1.6 to 1 for the ultimate phase.

There is a critical water supply problem in southern Nevada and the southern Nevada water supply project is vital to protect and conserve the dwindling ground water resources of Clark County and to provide a sure additional supply of water to serve one of the fastest growing areas in the United States. In less

than 15 years the population of southern Nevada has grown from approximately 50,000 to more than a quarter of a million, and it is expected that nearly 1 million persons will reside in southern Nevada by the year 2000.

Thousands upon thousands of persons have invested their lives and fortunes in southern Nevada and they need—and must have—water if they are to survive and continue to prosper.

It is important to point out, Mr. President, that authorization and construction of the southern Nevada water supply project will in no way interfere with the orderly plans for other water development projects in the arid Southwestern States. Financially and technically, the southern Nevada water supply project has independence and feasibility.

The project enjoys the support of all interested parties in the State—the Governor, the congressional delegation, and all municipalities and city groups located in the area.

The Nevada State Legislature recently designated the Colorado River Commission of Nevada as the State agency to contract with the Federal Government for the repayment of project costs and to operate and maintain the project after construction.

If adequate water supplies are not developed for southern Nevada in the very near future, there will be grave damage to our economy and our underground water supplies. Southern Nevada has reached the point in its development where the underground artesian basin can no longer support its population, its industry, and the large Government installations which have invested so heavily in the area.

The Senate Interior Committee recognized the critical need for this project by acting with speed and vigor and reported the bill with very minor amendments.

The bill enjoys widespread support. The project is needed; it is timely and reasonable; and it does not interfere with the larger plan for the Southwest.

Its passage is absolutely mandatory for the survival, growth, and prosperity of the people of southern Nevada and I ask the support of the Senate in making the dreams of full water resources for southern Nevada a reality.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill (S. 32) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

STATE DEPARTMENT ADVICE RELATIVE TO AMERICAN STUDENT INFORMATION SERVICE

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, last summer, one of my young constituents,

a college student, had an unhappy experience with a Luxembourg-based organization known as the American Student Information Service. In looking into her complaint, I obtained information which may be helpful to other American students who may contemplate employment of the type which she obtained last summer in Europe. The State Department has prepared a form letter in response to many inquiries it has received concerning the activities of ASIS.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS.

DEAR —: Thank you for your recent communication about the American Student Information Service (ASIS). The Department of State has received numerous inquiries concerning the activities of this organization.

ASIS was established in Luxembourg in 1961 after having operated from Denmark and, subsequently, Germany. It is a private organization with no U.S. Government connections. To the best of our knowledge, ASIS is not organized under the laws of any American jurisdiction, although it is our understanding that the two principal officers are Americans. Most students traveling to Europe under ASIS auspices find employment in countries other than Luxembourg.

The American Embassy in Luxembourg reports that it has received numerous complaints about the organization from students. On several occasions the Embassy has tried on the students' behalf to discuss these complaints with the directors of ASIS but has found the latter to be "totally uncooperative." In view of this situation, the Department cannot recommend that American students participate in the ASIS program.

For information on summer employment, travel, or study programs abroad, you may wish to write to well-established, nonprofit agencies such as the Institute of International Education, 800 Second Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10017, or the Experiment in International Living, Putney, Vt. Our information indicates, however, that the majority of temporary job opportunities overseas call for volunteer service rather than for paid employment.

We enclose a copy of "Opportunities for Summer Employment Abroad," which suggests additional sources that may be helpful.

Sincerely yours,
HUGH B. SUTHERLAND,
Director, Public Information and Reports Staff.

SMALL BUSINESS VICTORY

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, Mr. George J. Burger, vice president of the National Federation of Independent Business, issued a statement with reference to a recent Supreme Court ruling which is of considerable interest to small business. I ask unanimous consent that it may be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

George J. Burger, vice president, National Federation of Independent Business, today hailed the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in sustaining the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Chicago,

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Ill., April 24, 1964, in the *Federal Trade Commission v. Goodyear-Atlantic Refining* case as a signal victory for small business.

The Court held the Federal Trade Commission has found an agreement between Atlantic Refining and Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. under which the former sponsors the sale of tires, batteries, and accessory products of the latter to the wholesale outlets and retail tire service dealers is an unfair method of competition in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

This action of the Supreme Court, Burger stated, will free the Nation's 300,000 independent service station operators to purchase their tire, battery, and accessory products from suppliers of their own choice on a competitive price-quality basis.

He further advised these rubber company-oil company tie-in arrangements were first exposed in Senate Small Business Committee print No. 3, 1941, on facts presented by Mr. Burger to the committee.

This June 1 Supreme Court decision may well be looked upon as one of the most important actions under the antitrust laws in a quarter of a century, as it will apply to small business of this Nation.

FE

W.A. Dodd
"MORAL NEUTRALISM" AND THE
WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee made a significant and widely reported speech in the Senate Wednesday on our Vietnam policy.

I regret that I was not on the floor at the time he made the speech.

I did not know that he was planning to make the statement; otherwise I would have adjusted my schedule in a manner that would have permitted my presence.

I am in wholehearted accord with many of the points made by the chairman in his statement. But there are portions of his statement which I found confusing and contradictory and dangerous in their implications.

The Senator from Arkansas spoke for all of us when he said that he was opposed to an unconditional American withdrawal from South Vietnam. He said:

Such action would betray our obligation to people we have promised to defend * * * would weaken or destroy the credibility of American guarantees to other countries * * * and would encourage the view in Peking and elsewhere, that guerrilla wars supported from the outside are a relatively safe and inexpensive way of expanding Communist power.

I commend the Senator from this cogent statement on the consequences of an unconditional American withdrawal.

The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee also performed a distinct service in reviewing the many efforts that have been made to persuade Peking and Hanoi to come to the conference table in an effort to terminate the fighting in South Vietnam. He dealt frankly with the stubborn Communist rejection of all the approaches that have thus far

been made to them. He stated—and I am in complete accord with this statement—that, despite the rebuffs we have suffered, we must be patient and persistent in our efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement.

All this is to the good.

But there are portions of the Senator's speech which, as I have already indicated, trouble me deeply because they appear to contradict the intent of the several passages to which I have already referred.

The Senator from Arkansas, for example, said that we encouraged President Diem "to violate certain provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954." And at a later point in this speech he urged a return to the Geneva accords, "not just in their essentials, but in all their specifications."

I have the distinct impression—and I believe the Senator from Arkansas will confirm this—that the portion of the Geneva agreement to which he was referring above all was that clause which called for the holding of free nationwide elections in 1956.

It is completely true that President Diem refused to go through with nationwide elections in 1956, and that we implicitly supported him in the stand he took.

But he refused to go through with these elections for the perfectly valid reason that the Communists had set up a totalitarian police state in the northern part of the country, that there had been no freedom of press or expression or political organization north of the 17th parallel since the control of the area was surrendered to Ho Chi Minh, and that the Communists had been guilty of basic violations of human freedom and of the spirit of the Geneva accord which made it senseless to talk about "free nationwide elections."

This is a point that cannot be emphasized too much.

By way of establishing the facts for the record, I want to quote from a column by Max Lerner in the New York Post on January 24, 1955, written after an interview with President Diem:

Southern Vietnam will take part in the meeting to be held in June to discuss preparations for the 1956 elections.

Southern Vietnam, since it protested the Geneva agreement when it was made, does not consider itself a party to that agreement, nor bound by it.

In any event, the clauses providing for the 1956 elections are extremely vague. But at one point they are clear—in stipulating that the elections are to be free. Everything will now depend on how free elections are defined. The President said he would wait to see whether the conditions of freedom would exist in North Vietnam at the time scheduled for the elections. He asked what would be the good of an impartial counting of votes if the voting has been preceded in North Vietnam by a campaign of ruthless propaganda and terrorism on the part of a police state.

The scope and the degree of the totalitarian terror instituted by the Communist regime in North Vietnam from the day that it was established in 1954, can be documented from many sources. Among other things, they can be documented from the official Communist press itself.

Thus, General Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese military commander and the military genius behind the Vietcong insurrection, made a statement, remarkable in its candor, to the 10th Congress of the Communist Party Central Committee in October 1956. Let me quote a few excerpts from General Giap's statement as it was printed in the official publication, *Nhan Dan*, on October 31, 1956:

While carrying out their antifeudal task, our cadres have underestimated or, worse still, have denied all antimperialist achievements, and have separated the land reform and the revolution. Worse of all, in some areas they have even made the two mutually exclusive.

We have failed to realize the necessity of uniting with the middle-level peasants, and we should have concluded some form of alliance with the rich peasants, whom we treated in the same manner as the landlords.

We attacked the landowning families indiscriminately, according no consideration to those who had served the revolution and to those families with sons in the army. We showed no indulgence toward landlords who participated in the resistance, treating their children in the same way as we treated the children of other landlords.

We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror, which became far too widespread.

Whilst carrying out our land reform program we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas.

General Giap's admissions take on all the more significance when it is realized that the date on which he made the statement coincides roughly with the date of the "free nationwide elections" called for by the Geneva Convention.

I think—I hope—the Senator from Arkansas would agree that it makes no sense to talk about free nationwide elections in a country that has been cut in two when one portion of the country has been governed by a merciless dictatorial regime for several years.

I think he would agree that such an election could only be held if certain basic preconditions were met, including complete freedom of press and political organization, in both parts of the country, for a period of at least 1 year before the election; and also including a provision that the elections should be held under the auspices and control of some international body like the United Nations.

I hope he does not mean that Diem erred in not going through with the elections despite the political terror in the north, because it is clear as A B C that such an election could only have resulted in turning over the entire country to communism.

Let me point out here that at the Geneva Conference of 1954 the U.S. delegation at one point came out for free elections in North Vietnam under U.N. supervision, and that it was partly because of the rejection of this proposal that the United States decided against becoming a signatory to the Geneva accord.

In another portion of his statement the Senator from Arkansas said:

It may be that the major lesson of this tragic conflict will be a new appreciation of

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the power of nationalism in southeast Asia and, indeed, in all of the world's emerging nations.

And he went on to say that "largely in consequences of our own errors, the nationalist movement in Vietnam became associated with and largely subordinate to the Communist movement."

To suggest, as this clearly does, that the Vietcong movement is a nationalist movement is to completely twist the facts.

No one in Vietnam believes the charge that Americans have now come to their country in large numbers and are sacrificing their lives in its defense, because the U.S. plans to impose some kind of neocolonial regime on South Vietnam, for the purpose of exploiting its people and its resources.

On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of the people of South Vietnam look upon the Vietcong movement as an instrument of terror and oppression, seeking to subjugate them to the new imperialism of Peiping and Hanoi.

The true nationalists in South Vietnam are fighting on the side of the Government. They know that we have intervened at the request of the Government, and that our only purpose there is to help them defend their freedom against the antinationalist forces of the Vietcong.

But the portion of the Senator's speech which disturbed me the most was a paragraph which seemed to blur and confuse the truly fundamental moral differences between our side and the Vietcong, between freedom and communism.

I want to quote this paragraph to the Senate so that no one will be able to argue that I have pulled words or sentences out of context in my remarks:

A great nation—

Said the Senator—

is one which is capable of looking beyond its own view of the world, of recognizing that, however convinced it may be of the beneficence of its own role and aims, other nations may be equally persuaded of their benevolence and good intent. It is a mark of both greatness and maturity when a nation like the United States, without abandoning its convictions and commitments, is capable at the same time of acknowledging that there may be some merit and even good intent in the views and aims of its adversaries.

I am for seeking a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam war.

But I do not concede the Senator's contention that "there may be some merit and even good intent in the views and aims of our adversaries."

I consider communism to be one of the most totally evil regimes ever devised by man for the subjugation of his fellow man—a regime whose utter amorality and disregard for human life has perhaps only been equaled by the Nazi regime in Germany.

The Fascist regime in prewar Italy made the trains run on time. But I was never prepared to concede any merit or evidence of good intent to the Mussolini dictatorship because of this accomplishment.

Nor was I ever prepared to concede any merit or evidence of good intent to the

Nazi regime in Germany because it succeeded in eliminating unemployment, building some working-class houses, and producing a prototype of the modern Volkswagen.

Despite their purely mechanical accomplishments, the Nazi and Fascist regimes were evil in terms of every meaningful criterion. They were evil because of their total denial of human freedom, because of their complete disregard for human life, and because they were committed from the outset to the course of aggression.

In the same way, I believe that communism, whether of the Soviet variety or the Chinese variety or any other variety, is evil by any meaningful criterion and that men of good will, once they have understood its nature, cannot remain morally neutral on the issue of Communist expansion.

I can see no merit in a regime which, whatever its mechanical or statistical accomplishments, has wiped out every vestige of human freedom, persecuted all religions alike, and sought to convert its subjects into brainwashed robots.

I can see no merit in a regime which has inflicted more suffering and cost more human life than all the wars of this century combined.

I can see no merit in a movement openly committed to the conquest of the world, which practices expansion through subversion, through stealth and through fraud, and through so-called "wars of national liberation."

I can see no merit in a regime whose terror has since the close of the war produced a flood of refugees—in Europe, in Asia and in the Americas—which by now must number some 15 million.

I can see no merit in a Vietcong movement organized and supported and directed by Hanoi and seeking to impose its dictatorship by means of a terror that has, since 1961, resulted in the assassination or kidnapping of more than 35,000 South Vietnamese civilians.

The refusal to recognize the fundamental moral differences between freedom and communism, this moral neutrality for lack of a better expression, is not a new phenomenon. It has existed in every decade since the Bolshevik Revolution, especially among the intellectuals and in the academic community.

Each generation has apparently been obliged to pass through its own period of illusion and disillusionment, of confusion and enlightenment. Thus, during the thirties, despite the Stalinist terror and the several millions who died during forced collectivization and the mass purge trials, some of the greatest writers and noblest spirits of our times were counted among the "friends of the Soviet Union."

One by one, they had to pass through their own private process of enlightenment, and the private ordeal of breaking with a thing in which they had believed profoundly.

To those who have forgotten the history of this period, I would recommend that they go back and read a dramatic book entitled "The God Who Failed," in which men of the stature of Arthur

Kostler and Andre Gide and Ignazio Silone and Stephen Spender and many other prominent names in the world of letters, set forth the personal confessions of their experiences as "friends of the Soviet Union."

But perhaps the most eloquent and damning confession of all was written by a Jewish Lithuanian refugee, Dr. Julius Margolin, who had also regarded himself as a "friend of the Soviet Union"—until the Soviets occupied his country and deported scores of thousands of Lithuanians to slave labor camps in Siberia, and gave Dr. Margolin an opportunity to see the real Soviet Union—and not the phony Soviet Union that was shown to all the tourists who visited Moscow during the thirties and came away enraptured by what they saw and what they were told.

Dr. Margolin wrote:

Until the fall of 1939, I had assumed a position of benevolent neutrality toward the U.S.S.R. * * * The last 7 years have made me a convinced and ardent foe of the Soviet system. I hate this system with all the strength of my heart and all the power of my mind. Everything I have seen there has filled me with horror and disgust which will last until the end of my days. I feel that the struggle against this system of slavery, terrorism, and cruelty which prevails there constitutes the primary obligation of every man in the world. Tolerance or support of such an international shame is not permissible for people who are on this side of the Soviet border and who live under normal conditions. * * *

Millions of men are perishing in the camps of the Soviet Union. * * * Since they came into being, the Soviet camps have swallowed more people, have executed more victims, than all the other camps—Hitler's included—together; and this lethal engine continues to operate full blast.

And those who in reply only shrug their shoulders and try to dismiss the issue with vague and meaningless generalities, I consider moral abettors and accomplices of banditry.

These are cogent words. But, as the case of Dr. Margolin points up, the tragedy is that each new generation of intellectuals appears to be incapable of learning from the experience of the preceding generation. Each generation has its quota of party members and fellow travelers—and a much greater quota of moral neutralists who are not supporters of communism or even friends of the Soviet Union, but who simply believe that we must be openminded—both about the bad points in our own society and about the good points in Communist society.

So, while we seek a settlement in Vietnam, let us be under no illusions about the nature of the enemy or about the cost, in terms of human life and human suffering, as well as in terms of our own security, if we should fail to hold the line against Communist expansion in South Vietnam.

Let us seek an agreement that will put an end to the fighting. But let us avoid any agreement where our principles are so compromised and the free Vietnamese so weakened that a Communist takeover at an early date is bound to emerge. Above all, let us avoid the trap of coal-

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tion governments, which led to disasters in all of the central European countries.

Such a solution might provide us with a formula which saves face for us very briefly. But on the day that it is realized that the formula was no more than a face-saving device, and that it had led, as it was foreordained to do, to a Communist takeover in South Vietnam "the credibility of American guarantees to other countries, would have been destroyed as effectively as an unconditional withdrawal would destroy it; our obligation to help the Vietnamese people defend their freedom would be construed as a sham; and Peiping could not help but be convinced that its so-called wars of national liberation are a relatively safe and inexpensive way of expanding Communist power."

The Senator from Arkansas has said that the situation demands "major concessions from both sides." I do not know whether he was suggesting the possibility of a coalition government. I hope he was not. But certainly his words carry the implication that we are being too stiff-necked, that we are demanding too much and offering too little.

I challenge such a contention.

President Johnson has made the American position crystal clear. We seek no further expansion of the war.

We seek no territories and no bases and no realm of colonial exploitation.

We seek only the acceptance of one condition—that Peiping and Hanoi call off their aggression against the government and people of South Vietnam, that the fighting and killing stop, and that the South Vietnamese people be permitted to live their lives in peace and as they see fit.

In return, we have offered to include North Vietnam within the scope of the multibillion-dollar Mekong River development program, with the untold benefits that it would bring to all the peoples of southeast Asia.

This, in my opinion, is a wise and reasonable posture.

Less than this we cannot ask for. More than this we cannot offer.

In closing, I again want to compliment the Senator from Arkansas on his forceful presentation of the case against complete withdrawal from Vietnam. Whatever criticism I may have made of certain parts of his statement which I considered unfortunate in their implications, I want to emphasize that we apparently see eye to eye, not only on the question of immediate withdrawal, but also on the need for continuing to seek a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam, despite the obdure which the Communists have thus far exhibited.

FE

VA *Clark*
THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the debate in Congress on Vietnam which is beginning to heat up shows signs of being the type of constructive, intelligent criticism that I hope can be useful to the executive branch.

In view of the comments made yesterday by the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON], and a minute or so ago

by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DONN], I should like to make the following six points:

First, in my judgment, we must negotiate with the Vietcong. We shall never get peace without doing so. The way to do it is to tell Hanoi that it can bring to the negotiating table anybody it wants to, and that we will talk with whomever they bring. This inevitably will include representatives of the Vietcong.

Second, I agree with the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] that we ought to look toward bringing the United Nations into the Vietnamese situation.

Third, the sooner we can get an international police force into Vietnam to maintain a cease fire and help to keep the peace, the better.

Fourth, I agree with the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] that we should give serious consideration to returning to the 1954 Geneva accords and try to reinstate them.

Fifth, I agree with the Senator from Oregon that we cannot wait for Communist China. We must act without Communist China. She is not an enemy at the moment. Communist China has no military commitment in South Vietnam.

Sixth, the problem will not be solved by military measures. It will have to be done through diplomatic measures, hopefully with the aid of international institutions.

Having said that, I agree with the Senator from Arkansas that until we can bring the other side to the negotiating table, we shall have to stand fast on the ground. I do not want to escalate the war. I do not want to see the United States turn tail and run. I believe that a sound solution for the problem in Vietnam can be found.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the end of my remarks a column entitled "Whom We Support," written by Walter Lippmann, and published in the Washington Post for today, June 17. I am in complete accord with the position taken by Mr. Lippmann.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, one further item in connection with Vietnam gives me deep concern. It is an article entitled "Saigon Orders Profiteers and Terrorists Executed," written by Seymour Topping, and published in the New York Times of June 17. The article states that the new leadership committee which is running the South Vietnamese Government, has stated:

Vietcong terrorists, corrupt officials, speculators, and blackmarketeers would be shot without trial if there was tangible proof of guilt.

In the central marketplace of Saigon, soldiers erected sandbag emplacements that would permit firing squads to carry out public executions with maximum publicity.

This is Fascist, this is Communist, this is totalitarian action. I hope that Ambassador Taylor and our State Department will lodge the strongest possible protest against this barbaric action by the South Vietnamese Government and

will indicate that unless it is promptly changed, we will withdraw our support.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have referred may be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SAIGON ORDERS PROFITEERS AND TERRORISTS EXECUTED

(By Seymour Topping)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 16.—The military rulers of South Vietnam imposed stringent measures on the population today to enforce discipline and curb war profiteering. Senior officers of the National Leadership Committee stated that Vietcong terrorists, corrupt officials, speculators, and blackmarketeers would be shot without trial if there was tangible proof of guilt.

In the central marketplace of Saigon, soldiers erected sandbag emplacements that would permit firing squads to carry out public executions with maximum publicity. Thousands of city residents and peasants in their conical hats milled about staring curiously at the sandbag walls.

As work progressed, a terrorist detonated a 10- to 20-pound explosive charge in the busy civilian passenger terminal at the Saigon Airport. A U.S. spokesman reported that 46 persons had been injured, including 34 American servicemen, but none seriously.

LABOR CAMP TO BE SET UP

Vietnamese officers said places of execution would also be set up in other centers of the country as reminders that the regime intended to act vigorously. A forced-labor camp for persons accused of lesser crimes against the state is also being opened, on Re Island, off the coast of Quangnai Province.

The new measures reflect the feelings expressed by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, chairman of the 10-man leadership committee, which formally took power Monday, that a stern revolutionary regime is required to organize an effective national war effort against the Communists.

It was obvious that the measures were designed also to discourage political dissension or wavering if the military situation continues to deteriorate.

The militant Buddhist faction, small political groups in Saigon and students at Saigon University are already manifesting dissatisfaction with the restoration of military rule.

U.S. officials were uneasy about the tough line and by the reactions it might bring from volatile political factions.

TAYLOR CONFERS

Maxwell D. Taylor, the U.S. Ambassador, conferred at the Defense Ministry with General Thieu and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the Air Force commander, who has been designated by the leadership committee as the country's Commissioner General for Administration. The conference did not resolve the dispute over the committee's tentative nomination of Vice Marshal Ky as chairman of an executive council, a post that would make him, in effect, Premier in direct charge of the Government.

U.S. officials feel that the inexperienced 35-year-old officer would be a poor choice at this critical time.

The Buddhist faction, which would prefer a civilian executive council, is also blocking Vice Marshal Ky's appointment.

The Air Force commander stalked angrily out of the meeting with General Taylor and later, in conversation with friends, complained about the Ambassador's attitude.

Students at Saigon University have asked Vice Marshal Ky to speak at a meeting later this week to explain why it was necessary to reinstitute military rule after the resign-

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nation of the civilian Government of Premier Phan Huy Quat last Friday.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington Post, June 17, 1965]

WHOM WE SUPPORT

(By Walter Lippmann)

Whether we are dealing with Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, or with the foreign-aid program in general, there is one common problem which is crucial and central for all the many things we are undertaking. It is to find governments that we can support which are reasonably honest, efficient, and progressive, and are trusted by their own people.

We are learning in Vietnam how difficult it is to defend a country in which there is no government which can rally its own people. We are learning in the Dominican Republic what happens when there is no recognizable legitimate government to receive our military backing and our economic help.

The same difficulty is at the root of the disappointment, which is so great in this country today, at the results of the foreign-aid programs. We are, to be sure, much more vividly conscious of spectacular incidents like the burning of a library, than we are of the quiet successes. Nonetheless, there are disappointments, so many of them that the Senate has now voted another installment of foreign aid with the proviso that there is to be a radical reexamination of the whole policy within the next 2 years.

Without attempting to guess what conclusions will be reached in these 2 years, it is already quite evident that trouble arises when aid is funneled through corrupt, reactionary, or highly incompetent governments. It is not easy to find enough good governments in all the emerging and underdeveloped countries, and, if we are philosophical about it, we must not be surprised at the difficulty of finding them. The condition is baffling, but that is a concomitant of inexperience and backwardness.

Moreover, American officials who have to administer the programs are frequently in a quandary. As a general rule the most impeccably anti-Communist governments are more often than not reactionary, stupid, and corrupt—as, for example, the Batista government in pre-Castro Cuba, or the Trujillo government in the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, the more progressively minded parties or factions include almost inevitably not only the left but the Communists on the left of the left. It takes a lot more acumen and political courage for an American official to back a progressive faction than it does for him to embrace a rightist faction. This dilemma confronts us continually in our role as champion of the free world in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

Nevertheless, in the task of containing the expansion of communism there is no substitute for the building up of strong and viable states which command the respect of the mass of their people. The President, of course, knows this and has frequently said it. But the tragedy of our entanglement in Vietnam is that we find ourselves fighting what is in fact an American rear guard action to stave off the collapse and defeat of the Saigon government. In this cramped position, there is little opening or opportunity for us to use our power and our resources constructively in southeast Asia.

We may leave it to the historians to say how and why we are painted into a corner. Our task is to bring up our resources of power and wealth, which are intact, in order to cut down our unavoidable losses to the lowest possible cost in lives and in influence.

In our predicament it is a disservice, I think, to inflate and emotionalize the stakes in Vietnam, to make it appear that the whole future of America and of the western world in Asia and the Pacific is going to be fought out and decided in the Vietnamese jungle.

It is not going to be decided there, and it is not going to be decided in any other single place. Thus, for example, we must prepare our minds even now for the possibility that Britain will not be able to carry much longer the whole burden of her responsibilities from Aden and the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean to Singapore. There looms ahead of us the prospect of having enormous new responsibilities thrust upon us, responsibilities which do not begin and will not end with our entanglement in Saigon.

That is why, though we cannot and must not scuttle and run, we must use our resources and our wits to avoid becoming bogged down in a large land war on the Asian mainland.

CHANGE OF TIME FOR CONSIDERATION OF DAUGHTERS OF AMERICAN REVOLUTION RESOLUTION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to change the time for the beginning of the debate on the Daughters of American Revolution resolution from 1 o'clock to 12:30. The debate will then run from 12:30 until 1 o'clock, with the time to be equally divided between the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], or whomever he may designate, and the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration [Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I did not hear the complete statement by the majority leader. Is he now bringing up Senate Resolution 107?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; it will be taken up at 12:30 p.m.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the majority leader.

MANN CREEK FEDERAL RECLAMATION PROJECT, IDAHO

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs be discharged from the further consideration of H.R. 6032, to amend the act authorizing the Mann Creek Federal reclamation project, Idaho, in order to increase the amount authorized to be appropriated for such project. This is a companion bill to S. 1582, which passed the Senate yesterday.

I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 6032 be laid before the Senate and move its passage.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs is discharged from the further consideration of H.R. 6032.

H.R. 6032 will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 6032) to amend the act authorizing the Mann Creek Federal reclamation project, Idaho, in order to increase the amount authorized to be appropriated for such project (act of August 16, 1962; 76 Stat. 388).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to consider the bill.

The bill (H.R. 6032) was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote by

which S. 1582 was passed yesterday be reconsidered and that S. 1582 be indefinitely postponed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the vote by which S. 1582 was passed is reconsidered; and, without objection, S. 1582 is indefinitely postponed.

FE ———— *MAN* Mansfield
COMMENT ON STATEMENT BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT ON VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator FULBRIGHT, spoke on Tuesday on the subject of Vietnam. His remarks constituted a most constructive contribution to the consideration of this critical issue and were in the best traditions of the Senate. With calmness and deliberativeness, he outlined the dimensions of the difficulties which exist in policy respecting Vietnam and the restoration of peace in that region. It will be, I am sure, of great help to the President and it is of great help to all of us in our understanding of this issue. The speech received very wide press coverage and editorial reaction, as it warranted.

I ask unanimous consent that several editorials commenting upon Senator FULBRIGHT's statement be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, June 17, 1965]

A LIMITED OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

Decisions in crises determine the direction of nations more often than the philosophies of tranquil times. But a clear course set in advance is essential, nevertheless, in the kind of crisis that now seems to be looming in Vietnam.

The Vietcong's annual monsoon offensive, sheltered against American firepower by intermittent cloud cover, is straining the fiber of the South Vietnamese Army this year and is leading to a further buildup in American forces to over 70,000 men.

As the ground war intensifies, as American as well as Vietnamese casualties rise, there will be inexorable pressure on Washington this summer to throw American troops into the ground battle in increasing numbers, a step-up that under present unfortunate circumstances appears inevitable. Before this typhoon begins to whip about our ears and, while the possibility of orderly debate still exists, it is essential for the Nation to discuss its true ends and the means that should be employed to serve them.

Senator FULBRIGHT has taken this discussion forward to a new clarity after a long conversation with the President. His views should be read by every American—and we hope they will be read abroad as an authoritative statement. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee argues cogently against both "unconditional withdrawal" from Vietnam or an attempt, through escalation, to achieve complete military victory attainable "only at a cost far exceeding the requirements of our interest and our honor"—a cost that could rise to include ground combat with the North Vietnamese Army and even "massive Chinese military intervention . . . or general nuclear war."

The American aim this summer, in Senator FULBRIGHT's view—a view which agrees closely with that often expounded on this page and over a period of many months—must be a "resolute but restrained" holding action. The hope is that the Communists will see

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the futility of trying to win military victory and will at length agree to a "negotiated settlement [necessarily] involving major concessions by both sides."

At a time when some military men and some Republican leaders, including Representative LAIRD, of Wisconsin, are returning to the Goldwater objective of total victory and calling for stepped-up bombing of North Vietnam, this restatement of aims is invaluable. The country and its allies abroad can only welcome Senator FULBRIGHT's assurance that the President remains committed to ending the war at the earliest possible time by negotiations without preconditions. As we have previously noted here, there can be no such thing as military victory in Vietnam by either side, except at a cost so fearful it would not be worth the price—and even then would not be a victory in anything but name.

Yet the continued American troop buildup in South Vietnam, which shortly will triple the forces that were there in March, makes it vital for the President to speak out publicly himself. In recent months there has been a kind of ambiguity in administration policy that seems to have won the President as much support among Goldwaterites as within his own party. Only the President can lay this concern to rest.

The issue has been crystallized by Mr. LAIRD, who claims that the country will accept the troop buildup in South Vietnam and the casualties that lie ahead only if the objective is total victory, not if the outcome is a negotiated settlement. It is our conviction that Congressman LAIRD has misjudged the temper of the Nation as badly as Senator Goldwater did last fall.

The country will support the Vietnamese effort only as long as it remains convinced that it is a limited effort aimed at limited objectives. It will not accept unconditional withdrawal. But neither will it pursue the will o' the wisp of unconditional surrender. As Senator FULBRIGHT pointed out, "We must continue to offer the Communists a reasonable and attractive alternative to [a] military victory" that neither we nor they can win.

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 17, 1965]

THE RIDDLE OF VIETNAM

Senator FULBRIGHT's carefully worded address on American policy in South Vietnam, and Defense Secretary McNamara's announcement that about 20,000 more U.S. troops are being sent to that war-torn southeast Asian country, point up the enormity of the problems confronting the United States in trying to save the South Vietnamese from Communist conquest.

There is no easy solution to the puzzle, regardless of whether the emphasis in U.S. strategy is on negotiation or military action.

As Chairman FULBRIGHT, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sees it, there is almost no likelihood of achieving a complete and unconditional military victory over the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam—not because the United States lacks the resources to achieve such a victory but because the tremendous cost in American lives and resources would be out of all proportion to whatever gains could be won by insisting on total and absolute capitulation by the enemy.

The Senator also believes—and gives equal emphasis to the point—that unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam would have disastrous consequences.

His conclusion is that neither total victory nor unconditional surrender is in prospect for either side in Vietnam and the war therefore must be ended, sooner or later, by negotiated settlement which will need to involve concessions of some kind by both sides.

There is much logic to Senator FULBRIGHT's views. What he says, in his own fashion, is in line with what President Johnson has

been trying to achieve for some time. The President has offered repeatedly to enter into negotiations without preconditions to achieve a settlement in Vietnam. He has extended to the Communists in North Vietnam an invitation to participate in a massive program of economic development aid.

Senator FULBRIGHT's use of the word "concessions" will arouse alarm among many Americans and may have been an unfortunate choice in semantics. Perhaps "mutual agreements" or "two-way bargaining" or some such term would be more appropriate. Call it what you will, it is obviously necessary for successful negotiations to include a giving up of something by one side or the other in exchange for each gain won at the conference table.

There can be no hope of getting negotiations started, however, unless U.S. military forces in southeast Asia are maintained at sufficient strength to prevent Communist conquest of South Vietnam by force of arms. The immediate and urgent need is to stop the Red offensive and convince the enemy that it has no choice but to negotiate. It is in recognition of this need that more U.S. troops are being sent to Vietnam.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, June 17, 1965]

FULBRIGHT CONTRIBUTES

Senator FULBRIGHT does not know the answer for Vietnam, and unlike some other Members of the Senate and the House he does not pretend to. But Mr. FULBRIGHT is in the true sense a thinking man. When he speaks, after carefully marshaling his thoughts, he always contributes something to a dialog or a debate. He did so, after a long public silence on Vietnam, in a Senate speech on Tuesday.

The gist of the address was that in Senator FULBRIGHT's opinion we must persist in our support of the South Vietnamese Army, continuing our efforts to persuade the Communists that full military victory is unattainable; persist in our hope that such persuasion will lead to negotiation—despite the total absence so far of a sign on the other side of willingness to negotiate—and not escalate the war to the point of inviting such counter-escalation as might threaten general explosion, a point which he believes may be very close.

Mr. FULBRIGHT praised President Johnson for "steadfastness and statesmanship," and "patience and restraint," in resisting pressures to expand the war still more. This, along with his statement that we must not desert the South Vietnamese Army, serves as strong support of the President's fundamental position. All the more because the Senator speaks not for the administration but for himself, it helps the President in his resistance to those on the one hand who demand American withdrawal and those on the other who seem eager to expand the war further, regardless of the dangers.

As to solutions, Mr. FULBRIGHT proposed as a general proposition that the United States might offer to base a solution on the Geneva accords of 1954, which divided the old Indo-China, and which have not been strictly honored by anybody. This might be a way, and it might not. Mr. FULBRIGHT is trying to think of all the possibilities, and this particular speech at this particular time should help many others try to think, too.

THE PROPOSED MEXICO-UNITED STATES SALINE WATER CONSERVATION PROGRAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the purpose of S. 24 is to provide for expansion and acceleration of this Government's program of research and de-

velopment in the field of salt water conversion. This bill, passed by the Senate yesterday, will extend the authority for the research through 1972, and appropriate an additional \$200 million to carry on our activities in this promising area.

The existing program has progressed to a stage where it shows promise of converting salt water to fresh water at a rate which will be economically competitive.

The adequate supply of fresh water is not only a national problem, it is a worldwide problem. This has been pointed up acutely in recent years. Especially in our great Southwest is there an awareness of the magnitude of the problem. The threatened loss of supply has worked a distinct hardship not only in the States of our country, but also in Mexico, our friend and neighbor as well.

It is my sincere hope that acceleration of our desalinization research program will contribute to relieving the strain brought about by water shortages. I can think of no better way to apply modern technology to peaceful and humanitarian purposes.

I note that the Republic of Mexico either has in operation, or is considering the construction, of four desalting projects. One of them, a small pilot project on the Gulf of California, marks a mutual effort between the University of Arizona and the University of Sonora. It is my hope that the benefits of the research resulting from this bill, and those resulting from the projects of the Republic of Mexico, can be shared for the mutual benefit of mankind.

I make this statement on the basis of conversations, conferences, and recommendations made at La Paz, Baja California, during the fifth reunion of the Mexico-United States Parliamentary Group.

At that reunion, the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. ARKEN], and I made a suggestion that it might be a good idea to develop, on a cooperative basis, a Mexican-United States program in the desalinization of water. We know not only that it would be of great benefit to our own great Southwest, as well as other parts of the country, but also that, if a program of this nature could bring about a conversion of salt water to fresh water, and thereby irrigate more of our land and furnish more in the way of sustenance to our people, it would be a demonstration of real and needed friendship between our two great countries on a humanitarian basis.

Mr. President, I would hope, therefore, that the solid example set by our colleague, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN] while he was Governor of Arizona, by means of which a cooperative water research project in the field of desalinization was undertaken between the University of Arizona and the University of Sonora, would be given proper attention by the appropriate agencies of our own Government—the Department of the Interior, the AEC, and others—to the end that we would be able to under-